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Abstract 
 
 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to explain the essence of European legal and political 
mechanisms in promotion of human rights, particularly freedom of expression in the 
Russian Federation. The confrontation between Europe and Russia over the practice 
of this commonly accepted liberal democratic norm has become vigorous since the 
adoption  of  ECHR  in  1998  by  the  latter.  This   study  emphasizes  analysis  of 
obligations taken by Russia under international law and European legal and political 
instruments for monitoring the compliance. Deriving from the theory of international 
socialization developed by Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink the 
research tries to contribute into the understanding of the process and applicability of 
the theory to powerful norm-violating state. This is done through consideration of the 
ECtHR  case  law  and  evaluation  of  international  political  pressure  generated  by 
transnational advocacy networks based on particular case studies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 Table of Contents 
 
 
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... 3 
 
Abbreviations: ................................................................................................................................. 6 
 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 7 
 
1. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND .......................................................................................... 13 
 
1.1 General idea of socialization ............................................................................................... 13 
 
1.2 Theoretical concepts…………………………………………………… ............................ 17 
 
1.3 Spiral model ........................................................................................................................ 17 
 
1.4 Methodology ....................................................................................................................... 23 
 
1.5 Norm socialization in Europe .............................................................................................. 28 
 
1.6 Russian Federation in socialziation process ........................................................................ 34 
 
2. EUROPEAN  HUMAN  RIGHTS  SYSTEM  AND  RUSSIAN  FEDERATION: 
 
LEGAL MEANS........................................................................................................................... 36 
 
2.1 Europe‟s legal strength: Council of Europe ........................................................................ 38 
 
2.2 Russian Federation in Council of Europe............................................................................ 40 
 
2.3 International law in Russian legal system ........................................................................... 41 
 
2.4 ECHR and case law of ECtHR ............................................................................................ 43 
 
2.5 Freedom of expression and ECHR ...................................................................................... 47 
 
3. Court cases ................................................................................................................................ 51 
 
3.1 Grinberg v. Russia ............................................................................................................... 51 
 
3.2 Krasulya v. Russia ............................................................................................................... 54 
 
3.3 Dyuldin and Kislov v. Russia .............................................................................................. 56 
 
3.4 Filatenko v. Russia .............................................................................................................. 57 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 4. EUROPEAN  HUMAN  RIGHTS  SYSTEM  AND  RUSSIAN  FEDERATION: 
POLITICAL ASPECTS ................................................................................................................ 62 
 
4.1 Human rights norms: OSCE ................................................................................................ 63 
 
4.2 Promotion of human rights: European Union ..................................................................... 66 
 
5. High-profiled cases ................................................................................................................... 69 
 
5.1 Abuses of journalists in Russia ........................................................................................... 69 
 
5.2 Politkovskaya and Estemirova ........................................................................................... 72 
 
5.2.1 International pressure ................................................................................................... 74 
 
5.3 Baburova and Stanislav Merkelov....................................................................................... 78 
 
5.4 Pussy Riot ............................................................................................................................ 81 
 
5.4.1 Legal aspects ................................................................................................................ 82 
 
5.4.2 International pressure ................................................................................................... 86 
 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................................... 90 
 
Bibliography.................................................................................................................................. 94 
 
Appendixes.................................................................................................................................... 99 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
  
Abbreviations 
 
 
UDHR – Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
ECHR – European Convention on Human Rights 
ECtHR – European Court of Human Rights 
CoE – Council of Europe 
 
FoE – Freedom of expression 
 
RF – Russian Federation 
 
INGOs – International non-governmental organizations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Modern   Western   civilization   is   bound   with   a   strong   application   of 
international  human rights norms, which are key factors and play a crucial role in 
maintaining  functional  liberal  democracies  and  rule  of  law.  After  the  WWII  an 
achievement of a long-standing peace in  Europe became an obligation of bilateral 
agreements  and  more  importantly  of  organizations  established  for  the  regional 
cooperation. The collapse of Soviet bloc and the Union itself in 1991 introduced new 
challenges to incorporate Eastern part of Europe into already functioning by that time 
European  human  rights  systems  led  by  Council  of  Europe  and  supported  by 
international law. Consequently, injection of the international human rights law to the 
national legal system has played  a significant  role in transforming geopolitically 
strategic neighbors, such as the Russian  Federation.  However, the transportation of 
such norms has faced legal and political confrontations that decelerated a process of 
rapid democratization. The Russian Federation is currently bound with the principles 
and  standards  of  the  European  intergovernmental  organizations.  The  Council  of 
Europe and OSCE treat and supervise Russia as a full member, while European 
Union holds a special partnership. Their human rights instruments operate as primary 
mechanisms to monitor  compliance with adopted liberal democratic norms. Russia 
has institutionalized European Convention on Human Rights and the case law of the 
ECtHR back in 1998. After all, the problems of incorporation of the Convention have 
become a matter of placement of the international law in legal system of the country. 
These  issues  particularly  expose  in  the  treatment  of  international  standards  by 
national courts while reviewing civil and criminal violations. Especially, the court 
cases over defamation charges against political opposition disclose the ignorance of 
the  guarantees   of  freedom  of  expression  necessary  for  every  democratically 
developing  society.  The  Constitution  of  the  Russian  Federation  clearly  ensures 
freedom of speech as well as responsibilities for considering international treaties in 
practice.  Additionally,  separate  Federal  Laws  and  resolutions  of  Supreme  Court 
regulate these issues in depth. European actors generate crucial legal and political 
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 pressure in order to keep the country on track towards democratic development. 
Russian citizens who consider their rights guaranteed by the Convention have been 
violated may lodge a complaint  to the ECtHR if all domestic remedies have been 
used to reach justice. Decisions concluded by Strasbourg Court are based on its case 
law and practiced according to the commonly accepted standards binding for all its 
member-states. 
 
Apart from the legal rhetoric, Russian Federation has been involved in the 
normative   cooperation  with  OSCE  and  EU  for  a  long  while.  Together  with 
independent human rights NGO‟s, these organizations produce a strong international 
pressure  over  a  norm-violating  state,  which  has  committed  to  respect  European 
principles  and  values.  The  criticism  initiated  by   these  actors  and  voiced  in 
organizational reports, official    statements and membership and cooperation 
suspension mechanisms direct international attention to the particular violations in the 
Russian  Federation  and  damage  its  international  reputation.  In  order  to  avoid 
dramatic  outcomes,  the  latter  is  expected  to  respect  such  a  development  and 
reconsider its practices. This causal relationship has genuinely been observed in the 
interpretational  confrontations over high-profiled  cases, such  as  murder of 
oppositional journalists Anna Politkovskaya and Natalya Estemirova. Moreover, the 
incident of  punk-rock band Pussy Riot exposes the most recent escalation of the 
normative confrontation between the West and Russia. 
This thesis focuses on the reaction of European intergovernmental and non- 
governmental  organizations on the violations of freedom of expression in Russian 
Federation as a commonly  accepted Western liberal norm. Theoretical abstraction 
leads  us  to  the  idea  of  international  socialization,  which  enfolds  the  process  of 
injection of Western values and norms to the reviving states through the cooperation 
with European intergovernmental organizations, nation-states and non-governmental 
actors. These actors are accordingly interested in developing democratic societies in 
Europe  expecting  to  reach  common  language  for  easier  economic  and  political 
cooperation  between  the  states  in  the  region.  However,  the  questions  of  what 
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 particular interests do the norm-giving and norm-taking actors follow behind the 
socialization process needs a separate research. The problem is now how successful 
or ineffective are the  strategies of socializing agents leading to the improvements, 
stagnation  or  decline  in  the   process   of  socialization  of  Russian  Federation. 
Consequently,  the  thesis  aims  to  find  out  how  the  European  legal  and  political 
socialization mechanisms affect internalization of the human rights norms in Russia. 
In Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel‟s book “International Socialization in 
Europe”, they define this type of actions “as a process in which states are induced to 
adopt  the  constitutive  rules  of  an  international  community”.1   The target  country 
which accepts to socialize should implement directives of a norm-giving center and 
finish  the  process  successfully  otherwise  the  socialization  will  not  happen.  The 
authors consider this process as a long-term aspect leading and possibly ending with 
complete adoption of commonly accepted rules by the nation-state. I would agree and 
add  that  a  process  of  socialization  is  not  about  deadlines  and  quickly  expected 
successful outcome, but a range of continuous efforts for the sake of establishment of 
a common  language,  based  on  the  collective  norms  and  values  under  a  single 
affiliation. The emphasis in this case should be made on this particular process and 
not on the immediate result. Schimmelfennig analyzes international socialization in 
Eastern  Europe  as   a  matter  of  strategic   cooperation  and  partnership  where 
international organizations play a key role as crucial  “socialization agents” of the 
region.  When  talking  about  the  organizations,  authors  introduce  a  character  and 
working instruments of such intergovernmental organizations as the OSCE, CoE, EU, 
and  NATO.  Respectively,  we  are  mostly  interested  in  the  first  three  European 
organizations,  which  also  help  to  operationalize  understanding  of  “Europe”  and 
“European norms” and its dueling features with Russian perspective in promoting of 
human rights and rule of law.  Schimmelfennig selects certain cases/states in Eastern 
Europe which have been (1) violating the values of liberal democracy since the 
 
 
 
Schimmelgennig F.; Engert S. & Knobel H. (2006). International Socialization in Europe: 
European Organizations, Political Conditionality and Democratic Change, Palgrave 
Macmillan, p. 2 
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 transition process started, (2) complied to socialize and (3) achieved certain degree or 
stayed in  stagnation.
2   
However, the research does not include Russian Federation, 
even though the countries have been selected geographically from different parts of 
Eastern Europe, representing various types of political culture. In addition, a broad 
analysis of violations and costs of condition compliances did not include the matters 
of human rights as such either. 
On the other hand, in Sinikukka Saari‟s book “Promoting Democracy and 
Human Rights in Russia” she thoroughly analyzes Russia‟s case in realms of human 
rights and applies theoretical aspects of international socialization in Europe. Initially, 
she uses the most comprehensive model of international socialization developed by 
Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink in  their  edition of “Power of 
Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change”  (1999).  This model, 
according  to  Sinikukka  Saari,  is  constructivist  which  includes  “rationalist  and 
material interest –based causal mechanisms”, together with a “socially constructed 
mechanisms”  where identities matter and states try to perform respectively. They 
“care about their international reputation” and certain needed values and norms turn 
out to be vitally important to be accepted.  Thus, according to author‟s interpretation 
of Risse and Sikkink‟s model, individual development of particular target state may 
be successfully influenced by transnational actors.
3  
Later, Sinikukka Saari develops 
 
ideas of Schimmelfennig, Engert & Knobel, Jeffrey Checkel and Daniel C. Thomas 
regarding  the  effect  of  European  international  organizations  and  the  problem  of 
implementation of norms because of the identity conflicts. She has narrowly analyzed 
a clash of European and Russian norms through political and legal cooperation inside 
European  regional  organizations  focusing  on  (1)   the   norms  of  human  rights 
ombudsman,  (2) abolition  of the death  penalty and  free and  (3)  fair  democratic 
elections. The study doesn‟t accordingly include many other important aspects of 
human rights initially suffering in Russian Federation. Also, theoretical background is 
 
 
 
2  
Ibid., page 64 
3  
Saari, S. (2010). Promoting Democracy and Human Rights in Russia, Taylor & Francis Group, 
p. 4 
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 poorly expanded in the study and precise direction not considered either. In fact, the 
situation around a freedom of expression in Russia is one of those values that have 
been concerning European political actors for decades and should contribute in the 
explaining of the wider problem  of democratization through norm socialization as 
well. 
 
In  her  edited  part  of  “Review  of  Central  and  European  Law”  Dorothea 
Schönfeld  has  analytically reviewed  the violations  of media  freedom  in  Russian 
Federation and Europe‟s negative reaction on it. She studies the situation of the media 
and examines the problem of Russia‟s  compliance with undertaken obligations in 
international  treaties.  The  author  names  the  case  of  Anna  Politkovskaya  as  a 
“symptom of a current situation of the media in Russia” and tries to  seek for the 
normative and ideological differences between European and Russian understanding 
of  freedom of expression. However, the author supports an European model and 
argues that a correct interpretation of freedom of expression is a key feature of the 
liberal societies respecting diversity and healthiness of political debates, which leads 
to true democracy.
4  
While investigating Europe‟s response to the violations of FoE in 
 
Russian Federation, the author similarly to Schimmelfennig and Saari analyzes the 
normative  cooperation of the later with European regional organizations and their 
working mandates.  However, Schönfeld goes deep into explanation why the norms 
are confronting over media freedom and analytically grasps problems of identity and 
public awareness. Thus, she does not comprehend  a  detailed study of how those 
intergovernmental organizations produce their normative power  based on concrete 
occasions. Important court cases issued in ECtHR such as Grinberg v. Russia  and 
Filatenko v. Russia are shortly classified by Schönfeld and not studied.  Moreover, 
this scholar article does not derive from particular theoretical framework, nor does it 
focus  on  the  character  of  the  case  law  of  the  ECtHR,  which  might  be  a  vital 
mechanism to understand the defamation cases. 
 
 
 
4   
Schonfeld, D. (2012). Tilting at Windmills? The European Response to Violations of Media 
Freedom in Russia,  Review of Central and East European Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 
236 
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 Consequently, legal assessment of Russian court cases reviewed in the ECtHR 
correlated   with   analysis  of  high  profiled  cases  such  as  the  murder  of  Anna 
Politkovskaya  and  an   incident  of  Pussy  Riot   could  bring  us  to  the  better 
understanding of the character of dispute over the practice of freedom of expression, 
political will of compliance and its costs, and finally, difficulties of the international 
socialization process in this particular area. 
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 1.  THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
 
In order to understand the character and impact of international human rights 
norms  promoted by European actors on the behavior and internal politics of the 
Russian Federation this research is basing on a theory of international socialization 
developed by Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink. In their edited book 
“The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change”, authors 
conduct a research based on a wide discussion among social scientists and lawyers 
regarding a role of international human rights norms in global politics. They elaborate 
a so called “spiral model” of the transformation of human rights practices to identify 
how political change in the target country is dependent on the commonly recognized 
norms and what circumstances make governments institutionalize and later fairly use 
those norms in domestic practice. Firstly, main theoretical ideas of this thesis will be 
described along with a concept of international socialization according to Risse, Ropp 
and Sikkink. Secondly, the “spiral model”  developed by Rissse and Sikkink and 
causal mechanisms for the promotion of those universal concepts will be described in 
details. Finally, the research will illustrate the central debate between rationalist and 
constructivist perceptions of the international socialization process. Such discussion 
is   analyzed  by  Frank  Schimmelfennig,  Stefan  Engert  and  Heiko  Knobel  in 
International Socialization in Europe: European Organizations, Political 
Conditionality and Democratic Change. It will form a basement for later application 
of the theory to the case of Russian Federation. The research supports constructivist 
ideas on socialization of the international human rights norms leading to the changes 
of practices. 
 
1.1. General idea of socialization 
 
First of all, it‟s important to ask whether the concept of freedom of expression 
is understood and practiced on the same level in a global context. An Article 19 of 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) says: “Everyone has the right 
to freedom of opinion and expression. This right includes freedom to hold opinions 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through 
any media and regardless of frontiers.”5  This definition certainly lacks clarity and can 
be interpreted by any country in multiple ways. A practical capability to understand 
and   interpret   the   freedom   of   expression   differently   makes   the   practice   of 
internationally recognized value less common. States as such have small legal power 
then to intervene into another country for the protection of human rights. That‟s why 
the violations  as  well  as  improvements  usually  depend  only  on  the  individual 
domestic practices of a certain state. Consequently, soft but effective and less costly 
instrument of democratization through norm socialization has found its domination in 
the modern Western approaches.  A process of socialization particularly involves an 
adoption of norms of certain community by a “target state” or individual and causes 
changes in behavior and identities of the later.
6  
A certain international community of 
 
states admits new countries in a case if the community norms and behavior are 
successfully recognized and gradually implemented by a future member. A strategic 
partnership  through   socialization  then  transforms  from  external  pressure  and 
deterrence  policies  to  the  pacification,  compliance  and  institutionalization  of  the 
norms  as  well  as  their  internalization  in  the domestic practice.  Norm  itself  is  a 
commonly elaborated collective product which is a compulsory condition of certain 
communities and plays significant role in communications between political actors. 
7
 
 
Risse,  Ropp  and  Sikkink  elaborate  three  stages  of  the  socialization  process 
necessary for achieving mutual goals for both parties. They distinguish the processes, 
which theoretically should  occur at once: instrumental adaptation and strategic 
bargaining; moral consciousness-raising, shaming, argumentation, dialogue and 
persuasion;  institutionalization  and  habitualization.   In   the  early  phases  of 
socialization, a norm violating state faces international pressure and  turns  to the 
instrumental adaptation through tactical concessions. A government of the target state 
 
 
 
5  
Article 19, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Retrieved from April 13 2013 
6  
Risse T. & Ropp C. S. & Sikkink K. (1999). The Power of Human Rights: International Norms 
and Domestic Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 11 
7  
Finnemore M. & Sikkink K. (1998). International Norms Dynamics and Political Change, 
International  Organizations, International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4, The MIT Press, p. 892 
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 normally acts so in order to ease the tension rather than ultimately establish such 
practice.  Another  process develops through  a  moral discourse and  includes such 
argumentative processes  as communication, argumentation and persuasion. At best, 
the target states simply admit the norms  which directly correspond their needs and 
preferences from the center. However, a single description of the idea or norm may 
gain  different  moral  definition  (sometimes  through  identity-based  claims)  by  a 
socialized actor  and create misunderstandings about its validity that  will lead to 
confrontation over the legitimacy of the information about human rights violations. 
8
 
 
Based on the cases analyzed later, we can observe that Russian Federation accepts the 
legitimacy  of  freedom  of  expression  norm  as  such;  however,  while  European 
discourse classifies the  criminal  persecution of the Pussy Riot punk rock band as 
violation of the freedom, Russia considers it as an irrelevant correlation with this type 
of definition. 
According to the authors of the theory, the states follow principled ideas and 
concentrate on discursive behavior. Russia is certainly following its ideas of political, 
military and economic  superpower in the European region and tries to generate its 
human rights discourse with democratic  claims. As far as such actions need to be 
justified on the legal and political bases, it gets involved  into the European human 
rights system, which on its own opens the door for European actors to  maneuver 
straightforwardly. In such cases, they practice argumentative and persuasive policies 
with   soft   or   radical   actions,   such   as   shaming   and   criticism.   Theoretically, 
instrumental   adaptation   of   criticism   transforms   into   the   actual   concessions. 
International pressure leads to the formation of globally negative attitude toward the 
norm-violating state and ashamed government is eager to compromise and provide a 
protection of human rights in order to save its own reputation. In addition, possible 
economic sanctions activate the opposition of domestic interest groups against human 
rights violations that leads to the change in human rights practices as whole.
9  
Based 
 
 
8  
Risse T. & Ropp C. S. & Sikkink K. (1999). The Power of Human Rights: International 
Norms and Domestic Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 13 
9  
Moravcsik, A. (1995). Explaining International Human Rights Regimes: Liberal Theory and 
Western Europe, European Journal of International Relations, SAGE, Thousand Oaks, London, p. 161 
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 on the case study of Russia this research would try to find how the international 
pressure   influences  the  practice  of  freedom  of  expression  in  conformity  with 
international law and how the country deals with such external and domestic pressure 
through argumentative   rhetoric, acceptance of   minor changes or   long-term 
compliance. The interest draws also on the circumstances in which the member state 
of the Council of Europe and OSCE is  tend to accept international human rights 
norms and provide their internalization domestically. 
The process of socialization should contain practice of instrumental adaptation 
leading to  argumentative rhetoric and ending with formal institutionalization and 
habitualization. As soon as a state decides to adopt a norm and behave appropriately, 
a slow and gradual process of socialization may start. Governments initially accept 
international norms instrumentally in order to  ease the international pressure and 
domestic  tensions.  However,  the  space  for  socialization  is   already  open  and 
transnational   and   domestic   advocacy   networks   get   advantage   to   entrap   the 
government into argumentation and activate dialogue mode. The human rights norms 
have  a  real  power  and  long-term  effect  only  “when  actors  comply  with  them 
irrespective  of  individual  beliefs  about  their  validity”.10   Consequently,  domestic 
 
internalization of the norm and a habitualization phase are crucial points for ensuring 
credibility  of  its  implementation.  In  this  case,  certain  norm  becomes  “taken  for 
granted” and  is  protected  by  rule of law,  which  is  essential  precondition  of the 
socialization process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
Risse T.; Ropp C. S. & Sikkink K. (1999). The Power of Human Rights: International Norms 
and Domestic Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 16 
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 1.2. Theoretical concepts 
 
 
In  the  following  subchapters  this  research  will  specify  the  details  of 
international  socialization  process.  That‟s  why  it  is  necessary  to  enumerate  and 
explain particular concepts further used in this paper. 
Liberal democratic norms – shared values among the Western societies based 
on democracy  and rule of law, which have particularly become one of the central 
norms in the modern international relations. This study is focused on particular liberal 
democratic norms, which are  recognized by European intergovernmental and non- 
governmental organizations as well as accepted by the Russian Federation in the legal 
framework and political discourse. 
Norm-giver – is  a state, international organization or a non-governmental 
organization, which guides the norm-taking nation-state towards adoption of liberal 
democratic norms and convergence with Western values. 
Norm-taker/target-state – is a state, which gets entrapped in the socialization 
process  intentionally or involuntarily and  overtakes the obligations to  accept the 
directives of norm-givers and socialize. 
Europe/European  –  this  term  is  utilized  in  order  to  generalize  certain 
understanding of human rights norms and legitimize political and legal mechanisms 
of the Council of Europe, OSCE and the European Union as well as leading regional 
national governments and non-governmental organizations. 
Prescriptive  status  –  the  norm  gains  prescriptive  status  when  it  becomes 
accepted by a norm-taking actor on the same level with a norm-giving one and the 
validity is not questioned anymore, even though the practice of such norm may still 
cause debates. 
1.3. Spiral model 
 
Risse and Sikkink elaborated a “spiral model” consisting of five different 
phases of  human rights change in order to draw a theoretical basis and understand 
which  of  those   communication  modes  such  as  adaptation,  argumentation  and 
institutionalization  dominate  in  the  phases  of  the  socialization  process.  Main 
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 processes develop in the framework of interactions between core actors, such as 
world-wide  international  intergovernmental  and  non-governmental  human  rights 
organizations,   Western   liberal   democratic   states,   domestic   opposition   and   a 
government  of  the  norm-violating   state.
11    
INGOs  are  included  into  so  called 
international advocacy networks and together with  intergovernmental organizations 
form  external  pressure  on  the socializing state.  These actors  constantly seek  for 
strengthening national networks and human rights NGOs in order to influence the 
norm-violating  government  from  inside.  The  graph  1  describes  the  essence  of 
“boomerang effect”, which forms in the result of collaboration between national and 
global human rights defenders. Instead of complaining to the government of the state 
regarding the violations, domestic NGOs head towards international actors. They on 
generate pressure on norm-violating government and support domestic activists. 
 
 
Graph 1: Boomerang effect 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
Ibid., p. 19 
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After the connections are made, transnational networks are capable to pressure 
a   norm-violating   government   on   international   arena   and   profoundly   support 
(financially   or ideologically) domestic movements at the same time. The 
“boomerang” pattern may differ though from country to country regarding specific 
conditions. 
12
 
In the mid 80‟s transnational human rights NGOs together with Western states 
 
and advocacy networks reached a point when so called “norm cascade” elaborated 
through international treaties started to spread world-wide. States started taking steps 
toward  compliance  and  institutionalized  fundamental  norms,  because  that‟s  what 
“good” states would do.13 
According  to  Risse  and  Sikkink,  first  phase  of  the  socialization  process 
activates as soon as transnational advocacy networks successfully direct international 
attention to the  norm-violating and suppressive authoritarian state, which is soon 
placed  under  a  so  called   “target”  for  changes.  In  such  conditions  domestic 
oppositional  movements  are  normally  vulnerable and  disable to  achieve changes 
solely, so they find “friends” abroad. The activation of international society of states 
and advocacy networks normally is caused by substantial violations in one country 
while minor, but systematic suppressions may efficiently be hidden by an autocratic 
regime in another. After thorough international attention has been addressed to the 
norm-violating state, transnational advocacy networks try to influence Western states 
and  international  intergovernmental  organizations  through  discursive  behavior  in 
order to make them share the  concerns and form a common position. In this case, 
effective  persuasive  “shaming”  policies  of  Western  actors  that  are  supposed  to 
promote  human  rights   in   the  world   jeopardize  their  critical   rhetoric.
14    
Not 
 
surprisingly,  the  target  government  initially opposes  and  denies  its  norm-violent 
 
 
 
12 
Ibid., p. 18 
13 
Ibid., p. 21 
14 
Ibid., p.22 
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 policies. However, open contradiction is covered by applying to other legitimate 
international norms, such as national jurisdiction or sovereignty.
15  
In response to the 
external pressure, norm-violators use different approaches. They form a strong public 
opposition against those foreign “enemies” based on nationalist moods. In this case, 
“boomerang arrow” works opposite to the weak  domestic advocacy networks and 
strengthens positions of a government inside borders. However, any scenario either 
positive and rapid or challengeable and slow points on the successful launch of the 
socialization  process.  The  government  usually  understands  that  the  trouble  has 
appeared and starts opposing  those imposed norms and criticism openly.  It then 
directly  hits  international  image  of  the   country  and  damages  its  international 
attractiveness that may lead to the long-term crisis.
16 
Active involvement of domestic 
advocacy  networks  through  material  and  intangible  measures  cause   marginal 
concessions  by  norm-violating  government  and  drive  the  process  to  next  phase. 
Normally the states, which care about their international reputation and have a desire 
to join or stay in any of the liberal communities, are more eager to change rather than 
those with strong isolative sentiments. 
International  political  pressure  is  supposed  to  cause  initially  minor  and 
provisional concessions in the norm-violating country. In such unstable for both sides 
moment  domestic  human  rights  opposition  gets  the  best  chance  to  activate  and 
increase pressure from inside.  Transnational  advocacy networks on the other hand, 
play  also  an  important  role  as  supporters.  They  legitimate  and  protect  domestic 
human rights activists on international level. However,  government may intensely 
suppress such movements through murdering, threatening and attacking  individual 
activists and organizations.
17  
Such actions definitely interrupt rapid development of 
 
events, but the whole process will lead to the long-term changes, stay in stagnation or 
move backwards. As soon as minor tactical concessions were made and certain norms 
instrumentally adapted,  the government is morally forced  to comply since every 
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 single further violation will cause negative domestic and international reaction again. 
The importance  of this phase is firstly, that human rights advocacy networks gain 
more  power  and  freedom  in   their  opposing  actions.  Secondly,  norm-violating 
government already recognizes a validity of the violations and gets entrapped into the 
argumentation  and  dialogue.  Finally,  the  concessions  made  for  the  instrumental 
reasons soon become significant part of the argumentative rationality. The  states 
sometimes undervalue a process of argumentative dialogue with the norm giving 
actors and  gradually get entrapped in it. That‟s why it becomes harder for them to 
deny critique and pressure directly. Thus, they start to care both about transnational 
and domestic evaluation and open space for completion of tasks. Other rulers may use 
force  to  resist  the  compliance  and  then  end  up  with  a  deposition  from  power. 
However,  both  scenarios  will  maintain  progressive  developments  and  move  the 
process of socialization to another stage.
18
 
 
It is important to distinguish though if a state starts referring to human rights 
norms  as  a   result  of  argumentative  and  persuasive  processes  or  changes  are 
instrumentally implemented in  order to silence the political pressure. In this case, 
Risse and Sikkink list four conditions in which the norms gain a “prescriptive status” 
in  the  spiral  model  of  socialization.  Firstly,  the  state  should  domestically  ratify 
internationally binding treaties on human rights. Secondly, all the prescribed norms 
should  be  domestically  institutionalized  (in  constitution  and/or  domestic  law). 
Thirdly, citizens should be able to submit their complaints and appeal to the domestic 
and  international courts if their rights are abused. Finally, the state is expected to 
rationally evaluate  criticism over human rights violations and deal with it through 
dialogue  and  argumentations.
19    
Moreover,  the  norm  is  considered  to  gain  a 
 
“prescriptive status” if its validity does not depend on the changes in tangible and 
intangible  interests  among  ruling  elite  of  the  country.  The  government  is  also 
expected to be welcome for the dialogue with transnational and domestic actors based 
on the mutual recognition of validity of norms and readiness for changes if needed. 
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 This stage provides a foundation for the institutionalization of the norm into national 
law through communicative behavior (dialogue, argumentation and justification).
20
 
However, there is still a fear that governments can enter into a dialogue and 
improve the  situation, but continue minor systematic violations inside the country. 
That  is  why  transnational  and  domestic  advocacy  networks  should  not  weaken 
pressure if just only massive human rights abuses are demonstratively eliminated.
21
 
Only  strong  constant  control  may  influence  target  state  to  assure  true  “rule 
consistent” behavior. In this case government gradually moves to the true compliance 
based on habitual practice. 
Thus, a spiral model of human rights change developed by Risse and Sikkink 
describes processes in which international norms bring fundamental transformation in 
the domestic human  rights  practices. Instead of just evaluating activities leading to 
the progress and endorsement of norms, authors mostly emphasize the difficulties and 
challenges of the whole process itself. The significant part of the process analysis is 
to find which mode of interaction is dominating in each socialization phase in order 
to better understand the process. Obviously, initially favored instrumental adaptation 
in the name of temporary conflict resolution is replaced by discursive behavior and 
use of argumentative rhetoric and persuasive policies.
22 
This kind of communicative 
 
practice may guarantee a proper institutionalization of the human rights norm in the 
domestic  legislation  and  provide  habitually  driven  norm  compliance  later.  The 
INGOs  and  international  intergovernmental  organizations  together  with  Western 
states are the most important foreign  actors  capable to prevent a norm-violating 
government  from  repressing  domestic  NGOs.  
23    
Norms  define  standards  and 
constitute  to  states  and  individuals  how  the  proper  behavior  should  look  like. 
Institutions then build up a system that determines how these norms should operate 
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 and be exercised. 
24 
However, it is vitally crucial and most difficult measure to keep 
the government under thorough control after the tactical concessions have been made 
and compromise accepted. 
25
 
 
1.4. Methodology 
 
This thesis is aiming to understand how the European legal and political 
socialization mechanisms influence internalization of the human rights norms in the 
Russian Federation. For  this  sake, a qualitative human rights research with a 
theory-driven empirical approach will be  conducted, where broad generalization 
will leave a place for exceptions.
26
 
This kind  of  qualitative  human  rights  research  will  include  an  overview  of 
 
European normative environment, legal analysis of the placement of international law 
and particularly the ECHR in the legal system of the Russian Federation as well as 
deeper grasp of Russian court cases brought to the ECtHR on freedom of expression. 
Moreover,   deriving   from   the   theory,   international   political   pressure   of   the 
transnational advocacy networks on the government of  Russian Federation will be 
scrutinized through high-profiled cases regarding the poor practice and guarantees of 
freedom of expression. However, the research is not going deep into the political 
reasons of the tendencies of violations of freedom of expression, which requires a 
separate research. 
The study will comprehend effects of socialization process on the 
internationalization of the human rights norms through detailed analysis of legal 
conditions and communication frameworks, external pressure on the target state and 
behavior changes.
27
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23 
 This scientific  research  is  concentrating  on  the  problems  of  socialization 
process powered by international pressure through legal and political frameworks on 
a target state in the field of freedom of expression. A systematic analysis will help to 
understand the essence of strategies of  European actors and Russian authorities for 
imposing one‟s own interpretations based on concrete cases. Thus, the research will 
try to  answer the question of how European intergovernmental  organizations, as 
central  socializing  actors,  together  with  non-governmental  players,  react  on  the 
violations of freedom of expression in Russian Federation and to what outcomes do 
they  lead:  improvement,  stagnation  or  decline.  The  answers  should  lead  us  to 
generalizing the problems of norm socialization process as a source for 
democratization in a broader sense. 
Unlike lawyers  who  are  building  a  research  on  the  compatibility  of  the 
arguments and ideas, social scientists try to broadly analyze, give explanations and 
draw understandings of social phenomena through empirical analysis of the collected 
information and contribute in issues of protection and promotion of human rights. 
28
 
Human rights research will permit to observe and understand mechanisms of 
 
social processes, as well as illustrate why these processes are as they are. A study of 
single country and observable phenomena will help to focus on concrete empirical 
data and concentrate on specific field of human rights. The research will be built so 
that a method of a single country study will contribute into the broader understanding 
of the theory and its applicability.
29  
Certain scholars  consider that such method is 
disposed  to  limitations  and  trivial  outcomes,  however,  the  single  country  that 
comprises all aspects of discussed problem as well as multiple potential observations 
can be a bright model for the inquiry.
30  
Generally, the issues of human rights cover 
socio-cultural,  political  and  economic perspectives  in  the  society.  Single country 
study on its own helps to analyze institutional and behavioral phenomena in order to 
better understand circumstances where human rights violations are likely to occur 
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 systematically.
31   
Thus, a  method  of  single  country  study  should  either  confirm 
theoretical  explanation of the social processes or reveal conditions where expected 
result is not likely to occur. 
The choice of a country derives from the features that relate to systematic 
violations  of  the  Western  community  norms  and  poor  tendencies  of  expected 
behavior in domestic practice. Like other countries in post-Soviet area, the Russian 
Federation has experienced a painful transition path. The process of incorporation of 
the  international  human  rights  norms  into  its  domestic   practice  have  mainly 
undergone under the auspices of intergovernmental organizations and  transnational 
advocacy networks. Formally, Russia has passed all the phases of the socialization 
process described by Risse and Sikkink. It has institutionalized binding human rights 
documents and accepted the norms in the political discourse. However, the research 
expects  to  find  whether  such  a  successful  formal  implementation  is  an  actual 
precondition for a respective practice. The  Russian Federation is not economically 
and politically weak state to be easily influenced by global  interest-groups. That‟s 
why,  the  process  of  socialization  might  not  take  a  dichotomus   character   of 
compliance with the norms. Russia has a resource in order to either fully socialize, 
refuse it or act according to its own understandings and significantly influence the 
process back and  even change the behavior of other normatively operating actors. 
Freedom of expression has been one of the most confronted human rights 
norms between Europe and Russia for decades. This particular civil freedom finds its 
guarantees in the Constitution of the Russian Federation and as well as international 
treaties incorporated in legal system of Russia. Based on the historical background, 
the practice of freedom of expression has been periodically improving. It means that 
domestic courts have started applying to the Convention and the government has been 
compliant to the decisions of ECrtHR. However, systematic violations have  never 
been eliminated. Improvements were periodically replaced by the deterioration over 
contested  cases.  As  a  background  of  practice  and  problems  of  the  freedom  of 
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 expression in Russia, empirical data generates between 1998 (adoption of ECHR) and 
 
2011. This period of more than a decade includes a cycle when disagreements over 
the human  rights practices (especially freedom of expression) between Europe and 
Russia went into a crucial phase. Certain compromise and improvements have been 
followed by the highly contested cases, such as murder of Politkovskaya, Estemirova, 
Merkelov and Baburova and incident of “Pussy Riot”. These issues have reactivated 
international attention, pressure and entrapped duel of norms once again. Analytical 
analysis is expected to find a correlation in the shaming and persuasion policies of the 
European actors towards a problematic target-state. Thus, the case of Russia is chosen 
to broaden the understanding of the idea of human rights promotion and satisfy the 
interest flown from the research questions. 
Besides  international  human  rights  norms  embedded  through  Universal 
Declaration of  Human Rights (UDHR) Russian Federation has been bound within 
European normative framework, on which the research will be mainly focused while 
analyzing Russia‟s international obligations for  guaranteeing protection of human 
rights in its territory. The terms, such as “Europe” and “European” are deriving from 
the   partnership   framework   between   Russia   and   European   intergovernmental 
organizations of which former is either a full member (CoE and OSCE) or maintains 
a specific cooperation with (EU). 
Unlike  traditional  legal  scholarship,  which  defines  law  as  universally 
functional  system  in  political  and  economic  environments,  legal  and  analytical 
analysis will provide a knowledge that can vary across countries and societies. 
From the social scientist point of view, the essence of law might be based on 
the democratic practice and decisions of courts, but with particular consideration of 
the society needs, political situation and legal problems that creates confrontation of 
normative positions and a conflict on how the law should be interpreted. 
32
 
In such a case of the conflicting opinions, the most efficient object to observe 
would  be  an  argumentative  behavior  of  actors  in  certain  common  normative 
framework, such as, for instance, Council of Europe or OSCE, where they are bound 
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 under multilaterally accepted norms.
33  
However, mostly states rely on  their own 
normative framework first of all, such as national legislature. Socializing actors then 
are expected to take this feature in account and try to incorporate international norms 
in the domestic practice of the state for the sake of opinion convergence. 
34
 
An important part for this evidence-based human rights research will include 
thorough  analysis of collected information, which covers broader aspects of court 
cases,  contents  of  legal  documents  and  obligations. Legal  explanation  of  the 
phenomena will be supported by philosophical views and justifications in order to 
strengthen its normative basis and emphasize political and social challenges for legal 
norms.
35
 
 
In order to conduct such human rights research, data based on the primary and 
secondary sources will be used. The analysis of organizational reports and resolutions 
of the observed communities, such as CoE, OSCE and EU and international NGOs, 
such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch will play key role in order to 
draw principles of the international pressure and frame socialization process. It will 
demonstrate the level of strength or weaknesses of the norm-givers in promotion of 
human  rights  in  Russian  Federation.  Other  sources  will  depict  quantitative  data 
collected by the human rights experts and used by the international organizations, 
governments and civil societies. 
All this will be certainly accompanied by the analysis of legal documents such 
as national  legislature (Constitution of the Russian Federation, Federal Laws, etc.), 
international treaties and declarations (UDHR, ECHR), the case law of ECrtHR and 
domestic court rulings. Additionally,  scholar articles in human rights international 
journals, scientific books and electronic sources on  the internet will be used for 
drawing multi-dimensional picture. As the conclusions of the empirical analysis will 
mainly derive from and be based on the cases of violation of freedom of expression. 
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 Quantitative   data   by   the   internationally   recognized   think-tanks   and   specific 
organizations will play a significant role as well. 
 
 
1.5. Norm socialization in Europe 
 
Frank Schimmelfennig suggests narrowing down the “socialization” itself to 
the norms and rules of a single society that shares common values, forms identities 
and  categorizes  its  members   as  different  from  others.  
36    
Moving  to  Europe, 
Schimmelfennig claims that international organizations such as EU, CoE, OSCE and 
NATO take all the responsibilities of the socializing agents in the region and socialize 
target country into the communities based on the Western liberal norms and values 
through instrumental and strategic behavior, such as rule of law, democracy and 
human  rights.   Consequently,  a  target-state  should  accept  imposed  norms  and 
thoroughly institutionalize  them.
37   
Thus, “international  socialization  in  Europe  is 
formally  institutionalized  process  carried  out  by  international  organizations  and 
aimed  at  expanding  core  liberal  values  and  norms  of  the  Western  international 
community.” 38 The strategy of reinforcement holds significant place in the study of 
socialization  by  Schimmelfennig.  The  international  organizations   offer  certain 
collective norms and standards of behavior as well as punish those who violate the 
conditions. Moreover, they use a beneficial strategy to decrease a level of costs and 
increase benefits for the whole community. On the other hand, a target state adopts 
those provisions in a case if the benefits are seen to be stronger than costs. 
The organizations differ according to their capabilities and incentives they offer to 
the target states. The ones, which produce material incentives (economic, military or 
financial aid) are mainly pursuing a strategy of exclusive socialization (e.g. the EU) 
and grant a membership to the almost fully socialized states. That is why conditions 
and requirements of such community are being relatively high. Other international 
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 organizations  (e.g.  CoE  and  OSCE)  maintain  inclusive  strategy  based  on  social 
incentives   (positive  international  image  building  and  promotion  of  rules)  and 
socialize  target  states  inside  the  community.
39   
According  to  Schimmelfennig  a 
community wishing to spread its own values and norms to the target state has failed 
to successfully socialize it in a case if only social incentives and disincentives were 
chosen as a reward for membership. Thus, such organizations as EU and NATO have 
been more effective offering materially more beneficial rewards than CoE and OSCE 
mainly relating to the social influence, which includes international legitimacy and 
domestic  resonance of rules.
40  
In the end everything is decided according to cost- 
benefit calculations,  where political conditionality in such countries as Russia or 
Belarus can promise little towards democratic changes. Western influence and control 
over the elections, human rights and free media  would affect the autocratic power 
exercise inside such countries. Furthermore, a party constellation matters a lot in the 
socialization process. Liberal governing parties have usually been more compliant to 
the  requirements  of  the  norm-giving  communities  rather  than  anti-liberal  parties 
practicing populist and authoritarian regimes. 
41
 
Schimmelfennig  draws  differences  between  rationalist  institutionalist  and 
 
social constructivist approaches to international socialization and introduces debate 
between them. On one hand, rational institutionalists claim that socialization happens 
in a technical environment where norms are equaled to the certain constitutive rules. 
In the end, the socialization process ends with changes in interest of the target-state 
and  not  in  identity.  On  the  other  hand,  constructivist  assumption  bases  on  the 
international community which acts in institutionalized and cultural  environment. 
International   organizations   inject   the   norms   and   values   of   the   international 
community to the target states. In the end, the process leads not only to the change of 
the interest, but identity as well. 
42 
Socialization process works better if a target state 
 
cares about its international image. The smoothness of compliance then depends if the 
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 adoption of norms and their proper practice grants the state a new status and equals it 
with other liberal democratic actors. According to Constructivist views “shared ideas, 
expectations,  and  beliefs   about  appropriate  behavior  are  what  give  the  world 
structure, order, and stability.” 43 
Rationalist perspective emphasizes self-defined preferences, which drive the 
actors to act on the basis of strategies, such as, for example, rationalist bargaining. 
The process of bargaining is  held between target states and norm-giving agencies, 
which are based on the self-interested  material and power-related preferences. 
44
 
Furthermore, both actors use the socialization process as an instrument which flaws 
along with confrontations for achieving their own goals. Western organizations and 
other socialization agencies  transmit their norms to the target countries in order to 
strengthen  their  own  security  and/or  gain  political  and  economic  influence.  The 
countries that share same liberal values and ideas are less confronting, because real 
democracies never fight each other. States accept the rules and directives of a certain 
community in order to increase their political and economic weight regionally or 
internationally.  Thus,  Schimmelfennig  argues  that  those  actors  are  not  really 
interested in  democracy and human rights if it does not bring them welfare and 
political strength.
45  
This research wouldn‟t agree completely with Schimmelfennig‟s 
 
opinion, as far as the states willing to rapidly socialize strive towards ideological 
change and convergence of identities that derive from the needs of the populations. 
Also,  a  target  state  is  not  usually  eager  to  accept  immediately  all  the  positive 
community norms, which normally do not entirely fit the country preferences and the 
confrontation starts which engages a process of socialization itself. If the international 
community is expecting high material benefits (rationalist) or thorough acceptance of 
the rules, the political costs are certainly higher. 
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 Another feature of the  rationalist  strategic assumption  is  “reinforcement”, 
which   explains  a  technical  side  of  the  socialization  process.  A  norm-giving 
agent/international  organization gives away positive rewards in a case if the norms 
have  been  successfully  socialized  or  punishes  for  their  violation.  This  policy  is 
considered  to  be  efficient  if  those  measures   affect  self-interest,  welfare  and 
preferences of the target state directly. Consequently, states are expected to adopt the 
norms quickly in order to get more and more positive rewards from the community.
46
 
 
Now, let‟s take a look at the constructivist approach to socialization process, 
which  flaws   in  the  international  community.  Generally,  the  strength  of  the 
socialization process through  social interaction inside the community is about the 
cooperation where member states have to accept collective values and comply with 
rules.  The  mechanisms  like  rhetorical  action,  legitimation  and  social  influence 
become crucial and lead such process. Norm-giving actor and a target state engage 
into rhetorical argumentation. They try to justify and legitimize their arguments based 
on the community norms and get each other entrapped into the argumentative phase 
described by Risse and Sikkink. These norms might be used by the target state for 
bargaining.  However,   they   will  also  introduce  the  costs  for  compliance  and 
violations. 
The community imposes a social influence on a norm violating state. Every 
single norm  violation brings a deterioration of state‟s international image. A target 
state, which is building its international reputation, is expected to efficiently comply 
with clearly defined and widely accepted  norms. 
47  
In order to make community 
measures effective the norms should be salient in the internal affairs of the state as 
well as constitutionally legitimate. Only clearly determined and  practiced rule that 
receives  significant  support  and  resonance  domestically  will  make  a  member  of 
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 community or an outsiders comply with it. 
48  
Inasmuch as it is harder to deal with 
non-member  states,  the  community  is  using  its  powerful  rhetoric  and  socially 
influences  towards   materially   weak  actor,  which  benefits  from  the  normative 
cooperation. However, the process might flaw in opposite way when dealing with a 
powerful  target  state,  such  as  Russia.   Schimmelfennig  suggests  that  Western 
communities have certain normative obligations such as  promoting democracy and 
human rights,  which  are even  “conditions”  for  a close  partnership.  However, in 
reality economic and political interests make Western organizations establish and 
maintain cooperation with norm-violator countries. For example, back in 90‟s the 
European  communities  have  established  such  relations  with  Russian  Federation 
concluding bilateral  agreements and offering affiliation in economic, political and 
security issues. The community should justify its measures and always relate to the 
legitimacy as well as treat the target states  equally. However, the policies of those 
Western communities vary towards different states based on interests. 
49 
For instance, 
 
after the collapse of Soviet Union, the European communities have been socializing 
geographically  and  culturally  closer  located  newly  established  Eastern  European 
states rather than other neighboring post-Soviet countries.  In a large sense rational 
and normative frameworks are closely  interlinked. Any serious normative change 
would involve rational perspective and vice versa, any  rational choice also would 
contain normative reference.
50
 
Thus, the European communities in socialization process produce effective 
 
social influence over the state and decrease the bargaining and self-interest based 
cost-benefit  calculations.  However,  it  might  not  work  that  smoothly  with  non- 
member states, which are  seeing a bargaining process as a tool to fulfill their own 
interest and diminish costs for compliance. This can be even stronger in the case of 
powerful actors, which influence the process on their side and constitute the rules by 
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 themselves.  It  is  crucially  important  how  strong  the  bargaining  power  of  the 
community is and how attractive incentives may it offer to the target state. Both sides 
then  may  refer  to  the  normative  obligations  and  the  community  ethos  in  their 
rhetoric.
51
 
The Council  of  Europe  (CoE)  is  one  of  the  most  effective  international 
organizations  that promotes and protects human rights through social influence. A 
state willing to join the  organization is required to ratify European Convention on 
Human Rights and institutionalize it in domestic legislature. Domestic courts on the 
other  hand,   should   integrate  international   human   rights   norms   into   national 
jurisprudence  and  use in  practice.  It  gives  to  the CoE  a superior  jurisdiction  to 
monitor human rights in its scope of influence. It becomes more effective to refer to 
the formal compliance of the member state in rhetorical dialogue or confrontation. In 
addition, the ECHR provides rights for citizens of member states to bring complaints 
to the ECrtHR, which has a jurisdiction itself to deliver binding decisions.
52
 
 
Thus, certain conditions make a target state either accept the criticism of 
international community, another state or transnational advocacy network and change 
identities, interests, behavior  or just refuse it. However, in the case of Russia the 
target state may also fundamentally influence the process on its side as well as affect 
the norm-giving actor itself. So, the target country may actively lead the normative 
interaction with international actors that certainly will involve the outcome as well. 
Constructivists measure the effectiveness of democracy promotion if the international 
treaties are ratified domestically, formal representatives of the target state admit the 
norm   in   their   discourse,   and   if   the   norm   practically   is   implemented   and 
institutionalized. 
53 
The research will try to demonstrate whether this measurement is 
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 enough valid to state that the democratic human rights norms are being promoted 
successfully in the target-state. 
 
 
1.6. Russian Federation in socialization process 
 
After the collapse of Soviet Union, a line of democratic improvements had 
been marked in Moscow. The creation of Constitutional Court was followed by the 
adoption of the Constitution of  the Russian Federation in 1993, which includes the 
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court and  statutory acts. 
54  
Freedom of thought 
and speech are guaranteed by Article 29 of the Constitution  as part of the section 
“rights and liberties of man and citizen”. Additionally, the document  provides a 
placement of the international law in domestic practice. Russia joined Council of 
Europe in 1996 and ratified European Convention on Human Rights in 1998. The 
Article 15 of the Constitution of RF says: “The commonly recognized principles and 
norms of the international law and the international treaties of the Russian Federation 
shall be a component part of its legal system. If an international treaty of the Russian 
Federation stipulates other rules than those  stipulated by the law, the rules of the 
international treaty shall apply”.55  Thus, the Convention  became a binding human 
rights formal document in the jurisprudence of Russia. Opinion No. 193 of PACE on 
Russia‟s request for membership shows that the organization was aware back in 1996 
about  the  difficulties  that  Russia‟s  accession  could  bring.  The  country  and  its 
government  were  totally  inexperienced  in  the  protection  of  human  rights  and 
population  not  appropriately  educated.  Consequently,  systematic  violations  were 
expected to take place and not be fixed promptly.
56 
However, it was more effective to 
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 include this geographically and politically important target state in the community as 
soon as  possible and socialize it from inside than bargain on conditions before the 
successful  practice  of  all  human  rights  would  be  achieved.  Russian  Federation 
provided protection of freedom of speech formally in the Constitution and accepted 
jurisdiction of ECHR, but it is important if these  measures were a matter of an 
instrumental adaptation or a true improvement leading to rule of law and democracy. 
It depends how much certain norms became salient domestically and gained “taken 
for  granted”  status  after  the  implementation.  Since  presidential  power  began  to 
strengthen in  2000, freedom of expression has become one of the most violated 
liberties in Russia. According  to the Committee to Protect Journalists, seventeen 
journalists were assassinated by 2006 since Putin‟s government came to the power.57 
 
In the 2005 report concerning the freedom in the world, Freedom House defined 
 
Russia as the only country moving backwards from Partly Free to Not Free status.
58
 
 
Russia ratified the Convention successfully, institutionalized it and citizens received a 
right to bring complains to the ECrtHR. However, the question is how clearly the idea 
of  freedom  of  expression  was  promoted  domestically  and  used  in  practice.  The 
international attention and pressure has  been fluctuating since the adoption of the 
Convention in 1998. It has especially increased due to considerable deterioration of 
the situation in media and cases against Russia on violation of freedom of expression 
overwhelming  ECrtHR.  However,  Russian  Federation  is  not  a  materially  weak 
country to be easily influenced by powerful rhetoric of any of the communities or 
transnational advocacy networks. Following up the international socialization process 
in Russia through analysis of  the legal commitments and political pressure of the 
European intergovernmental organizations and advocacy networks, the research will 
try to find if these elements are effectively influencing the behavior of target-state. 
According to the theory, shaming and criticism policies should make a target country 
change its behavior, interests and even identities. Institutionalization and 
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 habitualization phases of the socialization process are supposed to bring change in 
domestic practices of the state in the end. However, discursive behavior and dialogue 
mode has shown that  rhetorical justification of the truth over violations in specific 
field of human rights leads to the  misunderstanding and ideological confrontations 
that might suspend the whole process. 
The Russian Federation has successfully ratified the Convention and accepted 
the norm of freedom of expression in its formal discourse accordingly. The norm has 
been implemented in the domestic legal system long ago and applied in the practice. 
That‟s why the research is not focusing  on initial phases of the socialization of 
freedom of expression as a new value, but emphasizes the matters of its practice as 
already  recognized  and  accepted  phenomena.  Legal  application  and   rhetorical 
argumentations caused by the international pressure are expected to reveal a progress, 
stagnation or decline towards prescribing the norm “taken for granted” status. 
The research is focused on the types of policies (argumentative, persuasive, 
compliance) and actual mechanisms of the international actors and target state used to 
impose one‟s own discourse on specific cases. 
 
 
 
2.  EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM AND RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION: LEGAL MEANS 
 
 
 
The essence of human rights norm injection process in the norm-violating 
country is  principally based on the interaction between Western norm-givers and a 
norm-taker target-state.  Large portion of this collaboration depends on the political 
will of international organizations dominated by the interests of Western governments 
and is led by the legally binding agreements or duties of membership. International 
intergovernmental organizations are primary actors in the  socialization process and 
transnational advocacy networks play backing role, especially when  dealing with 
powerful   target   state.   Certainly,   a  norm-taking   government   accepting  liberal 
democratic norms sees the intergovernmental organizations as a less biased platform 
for pursuing its own national interests that requires acceptance of certain normative or 
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 legal jurisdiction of the particular community. The reaction of such intergovernmental 
organizations   and   non-governmental   watchdogs   on   the   behavior   of   national 
governments may directly influence the practice of democracy, human rights and rule 
of  law.  The  integration  into  European   legal,  political,  economic  and  security 
environment is basically led by the Council of Europe, OSCE and European Union. 
All three international communities have been playing a key role in  the European 
socialization process since their creation until now. Their normative, political and 
economic  strength  allowed  them  to  produce  tangible  and  intangible  incentives 
through  persuasion and social reinforcement strategies. On one hand, OSCE and 
Council of Europe try to involve target states into the educative activities and guide 
them  along  the  path  of  liberal  democratic  norm  acceptance.  They direct  special 
missions to the target-states as well as promote the universality of the ECtHR case 
law.  Monitoring  mechanisms  then  operate  to  supervise  the  compliance  of  the 
governments and punish in a case of violations. On the other hand, unlike OSCE and 
CoE, which mainly aim to widely promote norms and change the behavior of a target- 
state,  EU  holds  strong  exclusive  strategies  and  offers  most  attractive  material 
benefits. Its expansion then leads to the straight substantive outcomes.
59 
However, it 
 
frequently relies on the legal standards and data of the OSCE and CoE as more 
codified  organizations  for  the  promotion  of  democracy  and  human  rights.  The 
primary actors to cooperate with inside target states mainly tend to be governments 
and their behavior determines  how flexible Western policies are in strengthening 
normative influence from inside and outside. 
 
Russian  Federation  is  a  partner  state  where  Europe  seeks  vital  natural 
resources  and  tries  to  balance  possible  military  danger  coming  from  Moscow. 
Development of  democratic values in Western understanding demonstrates then a 
significant  tool  in  order  to  reduce  normative  gap  and  speak  one  language  of 
cooperation.  Attempts  for  European  legitimacy  claims  and  international  image 
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 building,  as  well  as  international  pressure have  initially entrapped  Russia  in  the 
adoption   of   European   legal   system   under   Council   of   Europe   (CoE).   Later 
developments of sovereign  democratic values and increasing confrontation slowed 
the process of expected full compliance. However, the authenticity of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and legal supervision through the European Court of 
Human Rights has never been suspended. The effectiveness of promotion of human 
rights through political and social reinforcement strategies in Russia tended  to  be 
weak and have led to endless rhetorical confrontation. This is why this research 
argues  that  legal  and  political  pressure  of  the  Council  of  Europe  demonstrates 
operational  tool  in  dealing  with  a  state,  which  doesn‟t  strive  for  full  European 
integration led by Brussels, possesses strong economic and military power and affects 
the socialization process on its own. 
 
2.1. Europe’s legal strength: Council of Europe 
 
The  Council  of  Europe  (CoE)  is  a  legally  binding  intergovernmental 
organization with primary human rights mandate. It integrates states on the basis of 
acceptance of fundamental  human rights norms and monitors compliance. Unlike 
OSCE, CoE has limited geographic and cultural scope covering only European region 
and its peoples. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) under the CoE 
serves as a core binding human rights document in whole Europe. 
The adoption and institutionalization of the Convention and related protocols 
is essential requirement for the membership to the community. However, particular 
political  matters  may   fasten  the  process  of  inclusion  without  country‟s  full 
compliance  to  all  norms  and  continue   the  process  of  socialization  inside  the 
Organization as it happened with the Russian  Federation.  Every member state is 
expected to incorporate the Convention in national law and  domestic practice and 
make necessary changes towards harmonization if needed.
60  
Monitoring Committee 
 
of the  Parliamentary  Assembly  and  the  Committee  of  Ministers  then  supervise 
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 compliance and demonstrate their advisory potential through country visits, special 
rapporteurs  and  specific  observations.  In  addition,  Secretary General  and  special 
Commissioner for human rights attract international attention to the violations, make 
comments on violations and build up global  political pressure. This kind of social 
influence through shaming and persuasion is advanced by the  suspension tool in a 
case  of  human  rights  violations  and  non-compliance  with  community  norms.  In 
addition, the Council of Europe keeps legal strength through functional mechanism of 
European  Court  of  Human  Rights  (ECtHR).  All  member  states  are  obliged  to 
incorporate ECtHR case law and judgments, as well as provide citizens the right to 
issue individual complaints there. Its decisions are binding and the member state is 
strictly obliged to obey. 
61
 
 
Russian  Federation  was  admitted  in  the  Council  of  Europe  in  1996  and 
ratified  ECHR  in  1998.  Since  then,  the  Court  has  been  playing  crucial  role  in 
promoting human rights  norms and supervising rule compliance in Russia. Besides 
legal instruments, CoE has been politically influencing Moscow to ratify all protocols 
and reform its legal system. First serious concerns about the human rights abuses in 
Chechnya and limitation of Russian independent media created doubts regarding the 
effectiveness of the CoE enforcement mechanisms in Russia.
62 
However, ECHR still 
 
demonstrates an unprecedented legal and normative strength of the Council of Europe 
in socialization process of target states. 
The admission process of Russian Federation into the CoE was initially a 
politically beneficial strategic step. The harmonization of its standards and necessary 
reforms were moved to  the agenda of inclusive cooperation. Even though Moscow 
accepted almost all protocols and revealed readiness for reorganization, the Assembly 
monitoring report in 2002 noted vast violations of human rights including freedom of 
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 expression in the media and harassment of journalists.
63  
CoE‟s measures to rapidly 
socialize  Russia through reformation of its legal system and injection of European 
human rights norms into  its domestic practice proved to be challenging. However, 
initiation of such substantial European  supervision and introduction of functional 
mechanisms, such as ECtHR, strengthened involvement of Russian domestic NGO‟s 
and increased internal supervision too.
64
 
The CoE has been conducting much more principled policies towards Russia 
 
than OSCE and EU, which mostly rely on the weak political pressure and diplomacy. 
Charter of the CoE enables the member states of the organization deprive the voting 
rights  of  the  norm-violating  country  and  cut  financial  support  for  its  assistance 
programs.
65 
In 2000 Russian Federation temporarily lost voting rights because of the 
human rights violation issues in Chechnya. Russian  citizens have started appealing 
ECtHR since it became legitimate in the country‟s legal system.  Even if the state 
authorities comply with European Court and respect its decisions, the practice tends 
to be poor. For instance, the violations of freedom of expression in media have been 
opposed by the accusation in defamation against government authorities in the critical 
newspaper articles, which will be analyzed later. The integration of the ECtHR case 
law with its priority over  domestic unilateral interpretations of liberal democratic 
norms is one of the crucial points toward  successful institutionalization and future 
habitualization. 
 
2.2. Russian Federation in Council of Europe 
 
The Russian Federation has a promising beginner‟s story towards successful 
European integration, which has transformed to the extreme contradiction gradually. 
Council of Europe accepted Russia in 1996 after the disagreements over Chechen war 
issues  and  started  socializing it  from  inside rather than isolating Moscow as  an 
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 outsider. PACE opinion 1996 for the accession of Russia included multiple criteria 
obliging Moscow to reform its legal system and harmonize with European standards 
as well as restructure  certain political rhetoric (e.g. denial of the concept of “near 
abroad”). Russia adopted European Convention on Human Rights in two years and 
received minor positive feedback about lawmaking  process in PACE report of the 
same year. However, the criticism of human rights violations and overall process has 
been evaluated negatively. Even though changes have been taking place slowly and 
domestic  actors  haven‟t  managed  to  strengthen  quickly,  accession  to  CoE  and 
acceptance of its legitimacy took European-Russian normative cooperation to a new 
level.
66 
Already by 2002 the first Russian complaints on freedom of expression were 
 
declared admissible in the ECtHR. However, the lack of acquaintance with European 
legal system by Russian lawyers and individuals caused many inquiries to be denied 
by the Court. 
67  
Before the  decisions of court cases started influencing the norm 
compliance process in Russia, two Chechen  wars already led to the argumentative 
confrontation. The monitoring missions were followed by the  suspension of voting 
rights for Russia in Parliamentary Assembly in 2000. However, a threat of Russia‟s 
withdrawal made CoE reduce the tension and restore the voting rights after a year in 
exchange  to  the  promises  about  the  improvement  of  human  rights  records  and 
European supervision in the conflict region.
68 
This is a pure example of the powerful 
capacity of Moscow to  influence the socialization process on its own and lead the 
interaction. 
 
2.3. International law in Russian legal system 
 
Political and legal affiliation with European intergovernmental organizations, 
which  socialize  a target-state either inclusively or exclusively, require analysis of 
domestic legal  system  of  the  particular  transforming  country  and  placement  of 
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 international law in it. One of the main requirements before establishing cooperation 
with European actors is a democratic structure of the state, practices of government 
and judicial system.  Respectively, “Russia is a democratic federal law-based State 
with a republican form of government."
69 
This law-based state or modern “pravovoe 
gosudarstvo” is supposed explain the main heart of Russian constitutionalism, where 
human rights are guaranteed as well. In Russian  Federation, the law or “zakon” 
derives from the norms applicable to its population and is theoretically regulating the 
order reflecting  justice and superiority of the law as in all democratic societies.
70
 
However, it‟s questionable how effectively is this approach understood and applied in 
modern Russia, where liberal democratic norms still confront and international law is 
poorly applied in practice. 
In  conformity  with  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights  (1948)  and  the 
International  Covenant  on  Human  Rights  of  (1966)  the  Constitution  of  Russian 
Federation guarantees civil liberties and political, social, economic and cultural rights 
for its citizens.
71 
At the same time it is a core source of legislation prevailing over the 
law and regulating whole legal system. It means that no law, international treaty or a 
legal act can be approved if it comes in conflict with the Constitution. It also defines 
the essence of the federal rule with separation of powers between: the President, 
which is a strong executive authority in the state; government led by the Prime- 
Minister,  which  is  appointed  by  the  President;  legislative  branch  consisting  of 
bicameral Federal Assembly; and judiciary that includes all courts. 
In order to make a sound legal analysis of internalization of particular field of 
international  law  and  human  rights  norms  in  domestic  practice  of  the  Russian 
Federation, it is important to  know how the system of courts is divided there. The 
stages of judicial instances in Russia develop at local district courts, which solve most 
criminal and civil cases and function as a source for appeal. Next higher instance is 
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 formed by the Federal Courts and followed by the Supreme Court. Another high 
judicial authority Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation mostly interprets the 
Constitution  and  keeps  tracking  the  conformity  of  all  sources  of  law  including: 
federal constitutional laws, federal laws, decrees, judicial decisions and international 
treaties.  The Constitutional Court often refers to the international law and decisions 
of the ECtHR  while solving number of international and domestic issues.
72  
The 
 
research is accordingly focused on the federal laws and international treaties, where 
former characterizes the second most important collection of judicial acts (after the 
federal constitutional laws) and later induces international norms and dominates over 
domestic law in the case of conflict. 
 
 
2.4. ECHR and case law of ECtHR 
 
International law and human rights norms are legitimate part of the legal 
system  of  Russian  Federation,  which  bases  on  the  Constitution  of  RF  (1993), 
jurisprudence of Constitutional Court and Regulations of Supreme Court.
73 
The rights 
and freedoms of the humans on the territory of Russia are protected under the Article 
2 of the Constitution: “Man, his rights and freedoms shall be the supreme value. It 
shall be a duty of the state to recognize, respect and protect the rights and liberties of 
man and citizen.”74   However,  we are particularly interested in guarantees of the 
international  law  provided  in  the  Russian  legal  system.  Article  15  (4)  of  the 
Constitution implicates on the significance and authority of the international law in 
the   legal   system:   “The   commonly  recognized   principles   and   norms   of   the 
international law and the international treaties of the Russian Federation shall be a 
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 component part of its legal system. If an international treaty of the Russian Federation 
stipulates other rules than those stipulated by the law, the rules of the international 
treaty shall apply.”75 
In addition to the Constitution, Federal Law on International Treaties (Federal 
Law further) adopted in 1995 provides detailed explanation of the general provisions, 
placement of the treaty in  the legal system of Russian Federation, matters of its 
completion, registration, accomplishment and termination. This law initially says that 
all  international  agreements  are  concluded,  approved  or  dismissed  by  Russia  in 
accordance with the norms and principles of international law and are consisting part 
of the Constitution of Russian Federation.
76  
According to the Article 5(2) of the 
 
Federal  Law,  the  rules  stipulated  by  the  international  agreement  of  the  Russian 
Federation prevail in a case if they differ from the rules stipulated by the law. These 
different rules then are endorsed through respective legal acts. The Article 22 of the 
Federal  Law  says  that  if  the  international  treaty  includes  rules  which  require 
particular provisions of the Constitution to be  changed, a decision on approval of 
such requirement will be issued through federal laws after certain amendments to the 
Constitution are carried out or provisions revised. All international agreements of the 
Russian Federation enter into force based on the dates agreed between the sides and 
in  accordance  with  the  Federal  Law  on  International  Treaties  that  once  again 
underlines the importance of this particular law. 
77
 
 
The basis for the formal encouragement of international treaties in the legal 
system of Russian Federation is fairly strong though. However, it‟s hard to say the 
same about appropriate  internalization of all international norms, because they are 
simply not always relevant. Judiciary system definitely demonstrates one of the best 
sources for observing applicability of international treaties. 
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 Article  2  of  the  Federal  Law  on  International  Treaties  defines  the  “the 
international  treaty of the Russian Federation” as an agreement concluded between 
Russia and another country or  an organization in a written form and in accordance 
with international law. In a case of its conflict with Federal Law, another appropriate 
Federal Law should be passed order to grant the treaty a prevailing status. Otherwise, 
the treaty will outweigh only secondary sources of law in certain cases. Legislation 
holds crucial place in the court performances together with the interpretation of the 
laws  by  Supreme  Court  and  Constitutional  Court.
78   
The court  decisions  have  a 
 
distinguished  social  effect,  but  they  are  not  taken  as  precedents  in  other  court 
hearings, because these decisions are simply not the sources of law. 
The  International  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights  has  obviously 
influenced the  composition of the Chapter II of Section I of the Constitution about 
“Rights and Liberties of Man and Citizen” which covers a deep and detailed grasp of 
human rights. Under this chapter, Article 17 states that “the basic rights and liberties 
in   conformity  with   the   commonly  recognized   principles   and   norms   of   the 
international law shall be recognized and guaranteed in the Russian Federation and 
under this  Constitution”.79   In  addition,  Article  46  (3) of  the Constitution  allows 
 
citizens to seek their justice internationally after all domestic legal instruments have 
been used: “in  conformity with the international treaties of the Russian Federation, 
everyone shall have the right to turn to interstate organs concerned with the protection 
of human rights and liberties when all the means of legal protection available within 
the state have been exhausted”.80 
The European Convention on Human Rights directly falls under the idea of 
internationally recognized human rights principles and norms and serves as the core 
document for ECtHR. Consequently, the Convention, which was adopted by Russia 
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 in 1998, can be utilized around any human rights related article of the Constitution of 
RF as well. According to the federal law from 30 March 1998 on ratification of the 
ECHR and related protocols, the Russian Federation, according to Article 46 of the 
Convention, accepts jurisdiction of  the ECtHR ipso facto, without any additional 
agreements.
81  
Thus, the Constitutional Court of the RF has simultaneously accepted 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  ECtHR  regarding  interpretation  and   application  of  the 
Convention and tried to institutionalize it in the country‟s legal system.   However, 
until now, there is no legal act that would regulate the obligations taken by the state 
to  implement the judgments of the ECtHR.
82  
Thus, Russian legal system lacks the 
form and order  for  the execution of decisions of the European Court as such. For 
fifteen years now, the process of  full institutionalization and habitualization of the 
Convention with appropriate legal practice has been marked as poor also because of 
judges and lawyers who rarely applied to it. 
83
 
The Ruling of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation 
 
from 10 October 2003 played relatively significant role in increasing references to the 
ECtHR case  law.  This is the first regulation of the Supreme Court of the Russian 
Federation that has been completely dedicated to the application of the international 
law.  It has urged domestic courts to take the interpretation of human rights by the 
ECtHR  into  consideration  in  practices  of,  for  instance,  “calculation  of  terms  on 
criminal cases, about the right to justice, about the arrest of  the accused and its 
terms”.84  The regulation has once again supported rights and liberties mentioned in 
 
the Constitution as well as pointed on jurisdiction of the ECtHR and importance of 
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 the Convention in Russian legal system.
85 
It certainly led to boost of awareness about 
ECtHR case law and its practices between 2004 and 2007. This is exactly the period 
when most of the cases  related to the defamation and freedom of expression in 
Russian media have been reviewed in the ECtHR. Here Russian District and Supreme 
courts have been particularly failing to use ECtHR case law in order to differentiate 
concept of free speech and abuses of reputation based on already existing experience 
of  the  Strasbourg  Court.
86   
The regulation  has  explained  the  conditions  for  the 
application  of international  treaties  in  certain  cases  as  well  as  defined  order for 
placement  of  international  and  domestic  law  in  Russia‟s  legal  system.87   It  has 
reaffirmed that international  law holds superiority in a case of its conflict with the 
national law of the Russian federation. However, the regulation hasn‟t included any 
reference to the case law of the ECtHR, which has  been particularly confronted 
between  Europe  and  Russia  in  the  court  cases  on  defamation  and  freedom  of 
expression. 
 
2.5. Freedom of expression and ECHR 
 
Despite the legal foundations, in order to find whether violation has truly 
taken place, Russian courts hardly rely on the international treaties such as ECHR, 
which contains Article 10  on  freedom of expression and might be able to help to 
prove opposite to defamation. In addition,  ECtHR case law on the same issue has 
usually been neglected, even though its practice should be commonly accepted by all 
members of CoE. 
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 Article 10 (1) of the ECHR says: “Everyone has the right to freedom of 
expression.  This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and 
impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless 
of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent  States from requiring the licensing of 
broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.”89  The freedom to hold opinion is a 
primary component of the democratic societies and the interference should be legally 
well-justified and treated carefully. Any thought is a source for the expression and its 
limitation brings repression of the ideas and a very basic human freedoms.
90
 
The ECtHR  has  developed  guarantees  for  the  protection  of  freedom  of 
expression in specific fields like press through individual cases. The case of Lingens 
v. Austria in 1986 is a bright example of the Court‟s political rhetoric. The journalist 
criticized   Federal   Chancellor‟s   political   moves   and   assessed   his   actions   as 
undignified  and  immoral.  Soon  after  that,  the  journalist   was  found  guilty  in 
defamation by Austrian courts. However, ECtHR concluded the violation of freedom 
of expression and emphasized “the importance of freedom of the press in the political 
debate”,  which  is  a  significant  element  of  a  democratic  society.91   Additionally, 
 
Article 10 of the ECHR may protect freedom of expression not only in newspapers, 
radio, television and films, but also in paintings, music and dances. 
92 
However, such 
nonverbal expression is considered to be violated if the author‟s work has displayed 
clear intentional viewpoint and  authorities have restrained his/her creation on the 
basis of this message.
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 Human beings simply need to express their feelings, concerns and share their 
thoughts with  others in order to develop as individuals. 
94  
Freedom of expression 
encourages construction of  original ideas and plays important role in building of 
functional  relations  between  government  and  its  people,  however,  the  protection 
methods  often  differ  even  between  European  democratic  countries  which  utilize 
similar legal systems.
95 
In the democratic societies, concept of freedom of expression 
protects free actions of individuals, but the interference/limitation is acceptable when 
prevention of larger damage for the society is required.
96
 
Second part of the Article 10 of ECHR demonstrates particular restrictions on 
the freedom  of expression in all means: “The exercise of these freedoms, since it 
carries  with  it  duties  and  responsibilities,  may  be  subject  to  such  formalities, 
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public 
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, 
for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of 
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality 
of the judiciary.”97  Nevertheless, the interference should be justified in the specific 
 
occasion and not be exercised after every single public criticism of the judiciary and 
authorities that would put overall idea of free society in danger. 
98
 
The implementation of the ECHR and the respective article on freedom of 
expression  in  the Russian  legal  system  has  been  problematic  for  years  since its 
adoption in 1998. The ignorance in the domestic court hearings has been caused by 
the lack of awareness of judges and  conflicting sides in the number of cases. In 
addition to this, ECtHR case law has been neglected by the judiciary, even though 
both Convention and case law have become integral component of the Russian legal 
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 system  since  the  adoption.
99 
Second  relevant  regulation  of  the  Supreme  Court 
increasing  weight of the international law has been issued in 2005. It once again 
confirmed that the Constitution guarantees citizens the right to defend their reputation 
according to the Article 23 and  provides freedom of opinion, speech and access to 
information based on the Article 29. In  addition,  the regulation stated that while 
dealing with the defamation cases ECHR and the case law of the ECtHR should be 
certainly taken into consideration together with Russian legislature.
100  
However, the 
Convention and the case law of ECtHR are not the primary sources to be considered 
in the domestic court cases. They function as watchdog over unfair limitations and 
nonconformity with international law. 
101 
The Convention states that the limitation of 
freedom of expression is admissible in the name of “the protection of the reputation 
or rights of others” if the restriction is lawfully justified and needed in the democratic 
society. Consequently, domestic courts should appeal  to it while issuing possible 
penalties against the defamatory actions. Defendant then can prove to the ECtHR that 
application of Article 152 of Civil Code regarding defamation has suppressed his/her 
freedom of  speech that has not been necessary for the democratic society. 
102  
The 
Court  in  its  decision  may  contain  political  rhetoric  on  violation  of  freedom  of 
expression and condemn the exaggerated penalties used against the defendant. 
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                      3.  Court cases 
 
The ECtHR and its case law are central legal instruments for the promotion of 
proper practice of human rights in Europe. In general, the Court concludes decisions 
out of the litigation  conflict between the person or group of people and a state. 
However, as it has been mentioned before, even if those decisions are binding for all 
parties, the jurisdiction of Strasbourg Court doesn‟t eliminate primary importance of 
the national courts. Regarding the freedom of expression, it relies on the principles 
and standards stated in the ECHR. The decisions  are based on the earlier cases 
deriving from the Article 10 of the Convention on freedom of expression, which is 
applicable to all members of the Council of Europe. For instance, through the case of 
Handsyde v. United Kingdom  from 1976, the Court made statements, which have 
been applied to every single acquittal later. It strongly supported the importance of 
the freedom of expression in democratic societies and noted that even shocking and 
disturbing  for  state  and  people  ideas  should  be  tolerated  by  the  authorities.
103
 
 
Moreover, in those decisions precedent judgments are accompanied by the individual 
explanations in each case that makes the practice more precise and accurate. Thus, 
especially the expression with  political motives is protected in the rhetoric of the 
Court  and  restrictions  rarely admitted.  The  evaluation  of  Russian  complaints  on 
violation  of  freedom  of  expression  examined  in  the   ECtHR  is  expected  to 
demonstrate European legal language and understanding of how the  international 
human rights norms and standards should be applied in practice as a whole. 
 
3.1. Grinberg v. Russia 
 
The very first case on freedom of expression has been reviewed and decision 
concluded in ECtHR on the case of Grinberg v. Russia. In 2002 Russian journalist 
Isaak  Grinberg  published  a  critical  article  about  a  newly  elected  governor  of 
Ulyanovsk Region General Shamanov in newspaper accusing him in suppressing 
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 freedom of media and rights of journalists. Particularly, the letter included legal and 
moral  concerns  regarding  the  criminal  sentence  of  the  journalist  of  “Sibirskie 
Izvestia” Yulia Shelamydova.  Also, Grinberg blamed the governor in backing the 
military officials  responsible for the murder  of  a  young  girl  and  stated  that  the 
governor had “no shame and no scruples”. 
The journalist was sued and accused in breaking Article 152 of Civil Code of 
the  Russian   Federation  on  “Protection  of  the  Honor,  Dignity  and  Business 
Reputation.”   Based on this  article, Leninskiy District Court of Ulyanovsk Region 
found Grinberg guilty stating that he insulted the plaintiff by saying the he got “no 
shame and no scruples”, which, according to court,  definitely held a defamatory 
character and wasn‟t backed by any sound argument. Moreover, the Resolution no. 11 
of Plenary Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of 18 August 1992 says that the 
statements might be considered as defamatory or harmful if the text contains false 
information. Also, Article 152 (1) of the Civil Code states that “the citizen shall have 
the right to claim through  the court that the information, discrediting his honor, 
dignity or business reputation be refuted,  unless the person who has spread such 
information proves its correspondence to reality.”104  Consequently, the defendant, 
 
Grinberg,  had  to  prove  that  his  statements  in  the  letter  were  indicating  on  true 
evidence and the criticism was accurate. However, the journalist has lost the trial and 
had  to  pay  to  governor  a  compensation  for  non-pecuniary  damage.  His  appeal 
demanding the court to distinguish  “opinion” from a “statement” turned into the 
failure as well. The court finally concluded that as  soon as the opinion had been 
printed in the public source of information such as newspaper, it transformed into the 
statement and violated dignity and professional reputation of the governor. In a year, 
Grinberg lodged an appeal to the ECtHR and blamed Ulyanovsk regional court in 
inability to  guarantee  his  freedom  of  speech  allocated  by  the  Article  29  of  the 
Constitution of RF and apply Article 10 of the ECHR on freedom of expression. 
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 In 2005, the ECtHR on its own concluded the opposite to the national court, 
stating that domestic court should have distinguished “statements of fact and value of 
judgments”. The later describes freedom of opinion and it‟s impossible to prove truth 
of value judgment. Consequently, its  suppression automatically means violation of 
the  Article  10  of  the  ECHR.  Second  paragraph  of  the  respective  article,  which 
explains limitations of freedom of expression and allocates the governments right to 
interfere, is unfriendly with the restrictions on political speech and open debates that 
may  weaken  public  interest.  European  Court  also  stated  that  citizens  of  the 
democratic  society  are  granted  a  right  to  receive  not  only  officially  accepted 
information, but also critical viewpoints, which increase political discussions among 
the population. The contested statements from the article had described concerns in 
the public that could emerge healthy political debates essential for the development of 
democratic society. That is why politicians and authorities are  expected to be very 
patient and tolerant towards openness of the people.
105 
Overall, the ECtHR concluded 
 
that Russia has  “overstepped  the margin  of appreciation”, which  means  that  the 
interference  was  not  “necessary  in  a  democratic  society”  and  the  freedom  of 
expression was violated.
106  
Now, essentially Grinberg has been judged according to 
the Article 152 of Civil Code of Russian  Federation that contains administrative 
punishment  for  the  defamatory  actions.  Even  if  the  Convention  was  taken  into 
consideration while hearing, the national court gave advantage to the domestic law, 
but didn‟t consider constitutional right of the citizen to freedom of speech. Russian 
Federation adopted European Convention on Human Rights in 1998, however, rapid 
incorporation of its certain articles such as the one on freedom of expression has been 
still a matter of future perspective by 2002. 
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 3.2. Krasulya v. Russia 
 
Another case Krasulya v. Russia demonstrates almost similar circumstances 
regarding suppression of the freedom of expression, but with criminal conviction. An 
editor-in-chief of a regional newspaper “Noviy Grazhdanskiy Mir” Vasiliy Krasulya 
published an article in 2002 criticizing decision about the appointment procedure of a 
mayor of Stavropol town. He accused the governor in bribery and negative influence 
over the legislative body, which became responsible for the appointment of the mayor 
instead  of  giving people the right  to  directly elect  him.  In  the  article,  Krasulya 
described the governor as “loud, ambitious and completely incapable” for what he 
was finally sued and accused in damaging dignity and professional reputation of the 
state authority. Before the court hearing, a criminal proceeding has been conducted in 
accordance with the Article 129 (2) of the Criminal Code of Russian Federation on 
defamation,  which  states  that  “defamation  contained  in  a  public  speech  or  in  a 
publicly performed work, and mass-media libel, shall be punishable by a fine in the 
amount of 100 to 200 minimum wages, or in the amount of the wage or salary, or any 
other income of the convicted person for a period of one to two months, or by 
compulsory works for a term of 120 to 180 hours, or by corrective labor for a term of 
one year to two years, or by arrest for a term of three to six months.”107  Soon an 
 
expert  linguistic  examination  showed  that  the  journalist  hasn‟t  stated  anything 
breaking   governor‟s  professional   reputation.   Another  interesting   fact   is   that, 
investigation  never  found  who  was  author  of  the  text,  because  the  letter  was 
published  under  another  pseudonym.  However,  Krasulya  was  responsible  for  its 
publication in the newspaper where he worked.  Despite that, district court found 
Krasulya guilty in slander and  accused him in public insult of  the state official 
sentencing to one year of suspended prison with six month conditional probation. It 
means that Krasulya had disseminated defamatory information proved to be wrong 
that  damaged   dignity,  honor  or  reputation  of  another  person.  Above  all,  the 
defendant‟s sentence has been aggravated through charges with criminal defamation 
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 as a serious crime, which according to Article 129 (3) considers either a penalty or 
correctional works for up to two years. In 2007, the ECtHR concluded regarding the 
case Krasulya v. Russia that the Russian side didn‟t distinguish statements from value 
judgments as in the case of Grinberg v. Russia and couldn‟t present enough reasons 
to  justify  the  limitation  of  freedom  of  expression  in  this  particular  case  and, 
consequently, violated Article 10 of the Convention. In addition, Russian government 
was found guilty in breaching Article 6 (1) on fair hearing when the district  court 
didn‟t consider the linguistic expert examination which could be a thorough argument 
supporting  defendant. Also, the Court stated that any kind of restriction over the 
journalist‟s profession  should be examined and the politicians should demonstrate 
high level of open-mindedness  towards  negative evaluation of their actions. The 
restriction is especially not admissible when criticism rises significant issues for the 
society, such as appointment procedures of mayor and bribery. The Court condemned 
imprisonment of the journalist that violated his liberty and more importantly, freedom 
of expression according to the Article 10 of ECHR. 
108 
Thus, the case of Krasulya v. 
 
Russia has been the first occasion of violation of freedom of expression with criminal 
conviction that reached ECtHR. It it‟s notable to mention that European Court in its 
final decision relied to the previous case of Grinberg v. Russia stating that the Court 
is obliged to monitor whether national court has applied to the necessary standards 
and principles expressed in the Article 10 of the ECHR  or broke them. In fact the 
criminal conviction as interference might be the worst practice towards guaranteeing 
freedom of expression in the democratic society and especially in press. Thus, it 
should be very accurately treated and sound explanations presented in order to justify 
such actions.  According to the Federal Law from 7 December 2011 on changes in 
Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, the Article 129 has been abrogated. 
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 3.3. Dyuldin and Kislov v. Russia 
 
This case covers another exclusive incident demonstrating abuses of freedom 
of expression  and  inability of the regional  courts  to  utilize ECHR.  The conflict 
basically emerged because of  an open letter of the Council of the Penza Regional 
Voters' Association Civic  Unity  to  V.V.  Putin  published  in  Novaya  Birzhevaya 
gazeta newspaper in 2000. In the letter, unanimous signatories accused the governor 
of Penza region and his “close circle” in spreading their influence and control all over 
the region. The authors of letter blamed the regional authorities and “acolytes”  of 
governor  in  “selfish  and  destructive  policy”   against  independent  media  and 
suppression  of  human rights  and  rule of law in  the region. In  several  months, 
members of the Penza Regional Government sued the Association as well as the 
newspaper that published the letter and demanded protection of their reputation and 
dignity, which certainly was approved by the district court of Penza. The district court 
considered that every State official working  in the regional government might be 
considered as part of the “regional authorities” to whom the letter has referred and 
therefore this term can apply to every plaintiff. Additionally, it noted that no sound 
evidence about destructive policies of the governor or persecution of journalists by 
other  officials has been presented in order to justify the statements against them. 
Finally, in July 2001, after the appeal has been reviewed, the final decision concluded 
that those above mentioned abusive  terms against the governor and his crew have 
held a defamatory character and based on the Article 152 on damaging honor, dignity 
and professional reputation. Both the Association and the  newspaper had to pay 
compensation to every plaintiff for non-peculiar damage and later had to  publish 
respective rectification. 
In October 2001, the co-chairs of the Association the Dyuldin and Kislov 
submitted the  complaint to the ECtHR claiming violation of the Article 10 of the 
ECHR on freedom of  expression. After the case became admissible in 2004, the 
Court involved organizations Lawyers  for Constitutional Rights and Freedoms and 
the Glasnost  Defense Foundation  as  third party.  They  later submitted  comments 
saying that “restrictions in paragraph 2 of Article 10 should not be 
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 interpreted as conferring standing to sue in defamation on individual public 
officials who had not been specifically identified, who would then act as surrogates or 
alter egos for the State.”109   Shortly about the decision of ECtHR from 31 July 2007, 
in its conclusion the Court once again underlined the importance of the freedom of 
expression for development of any democratic society, where press has an important 
functioning role. Taking in account these principles, the Court stated that press still 
should  respect  reputation  and  rights  of  others.  However,  the  letter  written  by 
members of the Association expressed their concerns regarding media independence 
in the region and it is a natural move for democratically developing societies. Also, 
the Court noted that none of the plaintiffs were personally mentioned in the letter that 
could  justify defamatory  actions  against  them.  The text of the letter overall  has 
pointed on the wrongdoings of the  government and could emerge important public 
discussion.  It‟s  worth  to  mention,  that  the  Court  relied  on  the  previous  case  of 
Grinberg  v.  Russia  and  didn‟t  accept  the  fact  that  domestic  court  was  acting 
according  to  the  principles  of  Article  10  of  the  Convention.  Overall,  the  Court 
concluded that “Russian authorities overstepped the margin of appreciation afforded 
to  member States under the Convention”, which means that interference was not 
necessary in  the  democratic  society  and  Article  10  of  the  Convention  has  been 
violated.
110
 
 
 
 
3.4. Filatenko v. Russia 
 
Another criticism of Russian courts‟ performance goes to the case Filatenko v. 
Russia. In 1999 , Aleksandr Filatenko, a journalist of Tyva regional state television 
publicly read a question from audience written on handed pieces of paper in live talk 
show  during  pre-election  period  in  State  Duma  of  the  Federal  Assembly of  the 
Russian Federation. The question was directed to the officials of “Edinstvo” political 
movement asking why the flag of Tyva Republic has been torn off from the car of 
another political party in front of the “Edinsto‟s” headquarter. However, the reason 
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 for suing journalist Filatenko in court was the way he worded this question in the live 
show. As far as no camera recording of the live debate was available, the court made 
reference to the statements of  the witnesses, who claimed that the content of the 
question was not voiced as it was written. Regarding the truthfulness of the statement, 
the regional police denied that there has been any fact concerning the offense of any 
flag. Consequently, the decision of the Kyzyl district court claimed that the journalist 
provoked a reaction on the question, but didn‟t read the content out in original. Also, 
according  to  this  conclusion,  defamatory  tone  of  the  journalist  didn‟t  have  true 
grounds.  Thus,  it  caused  wrong  attitude  of  people  towards  “Edinstvo”  political 
movement that disrupted the  dignity of respective politicians. Kyzyl District Court 
found the journalist guilty in defamatory actions and obliged to pay compensation to 
each plaintiff for non-pecuniary damage. The complaint Filatenko v. Russia arrived to 
the ECtHR in 2001, where the applicant argued that he has never specified any names 
of the plaintiffs while asking a question regarding the flag, but referred only to the 
area  near  “Edinstvo‟s”  party  headquarter,  where  the  accident  could  happen. 
Consequently, according to the applicant, there was no need to defend the state 
officials from defamatory statements and charge him for their disruption. On the other 
side, the representatives of Russian government emphasized the Article 49 of Mass- 
Media   Act   from   1991   regarding   duties   of   the   media   to   deliver   accurate 
information.
111  
Furthermore, the reference has been made to the case-law of the 
 
Supreme Court of the Russian Federation stating that requirements of the Article 152 
of the Civil  Code on defamation does not necessarily apply to only specifically 
identified person or a group of persons. In 2007, the ECtHR delivered a conclusion 
on  journalist‟s  application,  where  it  emphasized  the  importance  of  diversity  of 
opinions and ideas that strengthens healthiness of  political debates during electoral 
campaigns.  The  Court  criticized  Russian  authorities  in  lacking  sufficient  facts 
describing Filatenko‟s wording as defamatory. The journalist basically asked for the 
discussion over the issue and all representatives from every party had a chance to 
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 express  their  opinion.  Moreover,  the  Court  finds  very  important  and  interesting 
feature. The Kyzyl district court has not actually considered the text of the question 
itself about the torn flag defamatory, but the presenter who interpreted it as fact of a 
crime. Consequently, in fact, the  district  court has found Filatenko guilty not for 
reading out the question of a spectator in the  live  show, but for giving his own 
classification  to  the  issue.  Even  though,  Filatenko  has  numerously  refused  any 
personal involvement in the issue, the national court considered him guilty. 
The ECtHR, additionally, demonstrated its concerns regarding the Russian 
courts of all  instances, which have failed to find a balanced decision out of the 
conflict between freedom of  expression and the protection of reputation of others. 
Politically more important, the Court emphasized the importance of the open political 
debate, especially in pre-election period, important for any of the democratic society. 
Overall,  along  with  reference  to  the  previous  cases  on  Grinberg  v.  Russia  and 
Dyuldin  and  Kislov  v.  Russia,  the  ECtHR  considered  the  interference  in  the 
journalist‟s  efforts  to  bring  up  publicly  important  issues  for  discussions  as 
unnecessary  actions  for  democratic  society  and  stated  violation  of  Article  10 
respectively.
112
 
 
This research claims that the decisions of the ECtHR demonstrate European 
understanding,  thinking  and  legal  language regarding  the practice of  freedom  of 
expression overall, as well as particularly in Russian Federation over analyzed cases. 
The Court refers to case  law very often that is certainly not usual for the Russian 
national courts in practice. In the reviewed cases we have observed that the European 
Court  has  almost  never  put  under  the  question  the  fact  that  the  interference  by 
Russian national courts has been “prescribed by law”, for example, according to the 
Article 152 of the Civil Code of Russian Federation on defamation or 129 (2) of 
Criminal Code of the RF on dissemination of defamatory statements. All the analyzed 
cases confronted between Russian national courts and the ECtHR are unique in their 
nature  with  common  conceptual  and  legal  grounds.  These  grounds  disclose  in 
substantial reference of the domestic courts to articles of defamation versus criticism 
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 of the Strasbourg Court through case law and indication on acceptable interference 
standards, principles of democratic societies and importance of guaranteeing freedom 
of expression. However, it‟s important to understand that the European Court is not 
taking advantage over the jurisdiction of  the national courts, but examines certain 
cases and concludes if the decisions of the domestic courts respected standards and 
principles  of  the  ECHR,  in  this  case,  particularly  Article  10.  Thus,  ECtHR  is 
searching whether national courts have complied accepted international standards and 
norms and the decisions have been made on the basis of “assessment of the relevant 
acts”. When dealing with the matters of freedom of expression in Russia, ECtHR has 
regularly  referred  to  the  case  Lingens  v.  Austria  stating  that  the  politicians  are 
expected  to  be  more  patient  toward  the  criticism  rather  than  usual  citizens.
113
 
 
Consequently, freedom  of political  speech  should  be treated  exclusively and  the 
interference,  accepted under Article 10 (2), should be justified and examined. The 
application of international  norms, which are internal part of the legal system of 
Russian Federation, is possible to provide through prioritization of those norms, joint 
application together with national law or acceptance in the domestic law directly.
114
 
 
However,  the  effect  will  still  depend  on  whether  national  courts  signify  the 
international norms in practice or not. The Constitutional Court and Supreme Court 
have been referring to the ECHR more often than lower instance courts since Russia 
adopted the Convention in 1998. This tendency might be explained by the specific 
occupation and functions of those high level courts as well as lack of knowledge in 
lower ones, where most of the civil and criminal cases are held. Despite the negative 
records of the unjustified interference in freedom of expression, the importance of 
ECHR  and  the  ECtHR  has  increased  steadily  in  the  legal  system  of  Russian 
Federation. The  analyzed cases have been held in Russian national courts in the 
beginning  of  2000s  and  lodged  in  the  ECtHR  later,  which  delivered  respective 
conclusions after multiple years. Thus, Russian government has been entrapped in the 
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 ongoing cases during almost a decade that played a significant role in the changes of 
the domestic judiciary practices as well. 
Analyzed court cases do not show whole situation around the problems with 
incorporation  of the ECHR in the legal system of the Russian Federation and its 
practice. For this sake, there is a need for a thorough review of all respective domestic 
court  cases,  which  have not  been  examined  in the ECtHR  as  well  as  statistical 
quantitative  analysis  of  the  facts  of  violations  and  compliances.  However,  this 
research argues that the cases on breach of the freedom of expression reviewed in the 
ECtHR have fundamentally demonstrated a tendency of relationship between Russian 
national  courts  and  the  principles  and  standards  of  the  Convention.  Russian 
government has been obliged to be involved in the hearings led by Strasbourg Court 
for  years.  It  particularly   proves  entrapment  of  a  norm-violating  state  in  the 
argumentative mode, where decisions of the European legal mechanism are binding 
for both sides and bring actual results. According to taken  obligations under the 
Council  of Europe,  Russian  side  has  always  been  complying conclusions  of  the 
European  Court  on  violations  of freedom  of expression.  Moreover,  such a legal 
pressure has generated the regulations of the Supreme Court from 10 October 2003 
on  “application  by  courts  of  general  jurisdiction  of  the  commonly recognized 
principles and norms of the  international law and the international treaties of the 
Russian Federation”115 and from 24 February 2005 on “judicial practice of protection 
 
of honor and dignity…”116, which involved detailed explanation of the application of 
Article 10 of the ECHR in the practice of Russian courts. It considerably augmented 
the role of the standards and principles of the Convention. Despite that, the Supreme 
Court is not willing to supervise first  instance courts thoroughly and examine the 
application  of  the  international  norms  in  practice  that  leads  to  the  ineffective 
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 internalization of the human rights norms as well. Unlike the Convention, which is 
placed  in  the  Russian  legal  system  precisely,  the  case  law  of  ECtHR  lacks  its 
certainty in there. As far as Russia doesn‟t use its own case law as a source of law in 
general, the ECtHR and its decisions could  definitely fill the gaps in the practice. 
According to the recent report on Russia, the Freedom House has stated that similar 
defamation and criminal charges have been used by the state officials against existing 
independent newspapers and journalists also in 2010 and 2011 in order to control the 
activities  and reduce domestic anti-governmental rhetoric coming from  particular 
interest-groups. 
 
4.  EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM AND RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION: POLITICAL ASPECTS 
 
 
 
Political rhetoric is essential addition to the legal mechanisms in promotion of 
human rights in the target-states. European intergovernmental organizations, leaders 
of  particular  states  and   non-governmental  activists  generate  significant  foreign 
influence over socializing countries to improve the practice of adopted international 
human rights norms. International pressure operates as  a tool for shaming, ruining 
international image that affects economic and political attractiveness  of the state, 
legitimation on global arena; creates a threat for friendly bilateral relationships and 
membership suspension in affiliated organizations. The OSCE and Council of Europe 
treat Russian Federation as a full member and the strength of pressing mechanisms is 
expected to be compelling.   The European Union, on the other hand, promotes its 
standards and principles through a strategic partnership. 
Such persuasive policies through organizational mechanisms, meeting formats, 
written  statements,  media  articles,  monitoring  missions,  joint  projects  presume 
entrapping the  norm-violating state  into  dialogue mode with  expectations  for its 
concessions. 
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 4.1. Human rights norms: OSCE 
 
Unlike the Council of Europe, which demonstrates strength in promotion of 
human  rights  through  its  legal  mechanisms,  the  Organization  for  Security  and 
Cooperation  in  Europe  (OSCE)  is  mostly  focused  on  the  political  and  security 
reinforcement strategies through persuasion policies. The decision-making process in 
the OSCE is based on the principle of consensus. All members are equal in decisions 
and nobody enjoys the right to veto or gain majority.
117  
However, the exceptions 
 
might take place in a case of mass violations of OSCE principles and the country 
might be excluded from the organization. Additionally, through so called “Moscow 
Mechanism”, member  states may decide to send a monitoring mission to the rule- 
violating state without its agreement. 
On one hand, the consensus principle shows OSCE‟s weak points in decision- 
making process. However, back in the times of its creation this was the only way to 
drag Soviet Union into  the multi-dimensional cooperation where nobody would be 
able to downgrade its interests. In addition, as far as OSCE is based on the political 
commitments and cannot legally require implementation of norms, social influence is 
its  basic  instrument  to  be  ensured  through  compromise  with  world  powers.  
118
 
 
Lawyers would criticize such weak political obligations, which are unable to integrate 
in the domestic  laws and practices and bring direct compliance. However, political 
compromise, especially on  delicate human rights matters, might be more effective 
than legal commitments.
119  
On the other  hand, the OSCE covers a huge range of 
issues and matters of human rights make one minor part of it. 
120 
The influence over a 
norm-violating state might be generated only through the interstate negotiations and 
decisions through, for example, “Vienna Mechanism”. This instrument enables any of 
the member state to  bring  information to Parliamentary Assembly or Ministerial 
Councils and direct the attention  towards the situation in another member country. 
These  actions  lead  to  the  initiation  of  the  bilateral  meetings  for  the  sake  of 
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 recommendations to change behavior and comply with OSCE principles and norms. 
However, the  Organization lacks functional machinery (e.g. ECrtHR of Council of 
Europe) where personal appeals and complaints would be reviewed and individuals 
would play primary role in the processes. 
121
 
Opposing parties and governments through political bargaining may define 
human  rights  norms  and  violations  according  to  their  own  understanding  and 
interests. That‟s why it is  vitally important to have common legal  human rights 
standards applicable for all members of the community. 
122
 
Even though OSCE includes a Human Rights dimension, the nature of the 
organization generally is built on the security related issues rather than protection of 
human rights. Unlike other  international organizations such as EU and CoE, the 
OSCE is not a treaty-based community with legally binding commitments.
123 
Human 
rights issues are generated by the Organization inside the  “Human Dimension”. It 
initially has been documented under the humanitarian concerns section of  Helsinki 
Final Act as a concept of human rights contacts. 
124  
The Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights under the OSCE is another tool with a mandate of 
gathering and presenting information about human rights conditions in member states 
as well as monitoring election processes. Additionally, a Representative on Freedom 
of Media (RFOM) plays significant role in  preparing critical reports that could be 
successfully  used  against  norm-violator  countries.
125   
As  far  as  Organization  is 
inclusive   by   its   nature,   the   scope   of   the   Representative‟s   activities   covers 
recommendations,   reports,   and   technical   assistance  programs   directed   to   the 
improvement of practices of freedom of expression in participating states.
126 
Yet, the 
title and post of the Representative sound more promising, than it is in reality. There 
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 is still no actual functioning mechanism enabling the Representative to influence a 
norm-violating government and force to comply. However, the mandate for human 
rights promotion helps to shame the target government internationally and entrap it 
into argumentative and communicative strategies. 
One of the most important tasks of the Representative is to bring the attention 
of  international  community to the facts of human rights violations. The concerns 
towards  Russia  have  been  marked  over  number  of  detentions  and  murders  of 
journalists in last decade 
127   
as  well as other incidents related to the violation of 
freedom of expression. The case of “Pussy  Riot” blew up the reaction of Western 
human rights protectors and found a wide resonance among   international 
organizations as well. The Representative on Freedom of Media was one of those 
who  dramatically condemned a verdict of the Russian court about imprisoning the 
punk rock  group  members in jail:  “Charges of hooliganism and  religious hatred 
should not be used to curb freedom of expression. Speech no matter how provocative, 
satirical   or   sensitive   should   not   be   restricted   or   suppressed   and   under   no 
circumstances  should  it  lead  to  imprisonment.”128   Overall,  the  OSCE  actively 
 
supports democracy  and  rule  of  law  in  the  member  states  and  assists  in  norm 
socialization  process  through  political  negotiations  as  well  as  monitoring  of  the 
elections and involvement into peaceful conflict resolution processes. As far as main 
practical  activities  drive  through  the  technical  assistance  educative  and  training 
programs as well as just assisting the member states  in  democratic processes, the 
strength of the rhetoric is not expected to be highly persuasive and  clear-cut.
129
 
Since 2003 the monitoring mission of the OSCE has been evaluating both 
 
parliamentary  and  presidential  elections  in  the  Russian  Federation  negatively.
130
 
 
 
 
127 
RFE/RL. (2012, May 10). Osce concerned by detention of journalists in russia . Retrieved 
from http://www.rferl.org/content/osce_representative_criticizes/24576796.html 
128   
OSCE. (2011, June 23).  Freedom  of expression  at stake,  warns  OSCE  media freedom 
representative following russy riot verdict. Retrieved from  http://www.osce.org/fom/92939 
129 
Saari, S. (2010). Promoting Democracy and Human Rights in Russia, Taylor & Francis 
Group, p. 21 
130 
Радио Свобода (2012, Февраль 26). Россия и ОБСЕ, 
http://www.svoboda.org/content/article/24496105.html 
 
 
 
 
65 
 Unequal campaign conditions, limited voters‟ choice, mistrust in transparency and 
other sort of critique over violations have formed an overall long-term confrontation 
mode and deepened gaps between two sides.
131  
Moreover, Russian political elite is 
unsatisfied with the growing involvement of the OSCE in the matters of democracy 
and  human  rights  practice  in  Russian  Federation.  According  to  this  vision  such 
actions go beyond the classical borders of the OSCE which should be limited within 
the political dialogue and security problems of Europe.
132 
It once again demonstrates 
weight of the European actors in promotion and improvement of human rights  in 
Russia and unwillingness of Moscow to accept imposed norms in whatever form they 
appear. 
 
4.2. Promotion of human rights: European Union 
 
The European Union is a complete opposite of the OSCE, which tries to 
socialize a  target state inclusively (from inside). The EU is economically the most 
powerful and wealthiest  intergovernmental organization in Europe. High interest in 
access to its markets and freedoms requires the Organization to be the most exclusive 
and selective regarding enlargement and  neighborhood policies. Common political 
and economic interests generated by the member states  reveal in social incentives 
towards target states through assistantship promises or in opposite, threatening with 
suspension of  aid  and  partnership  programs.
133   
In  order  to  receive  the  material 
 
benefits from the EU, one should comply with the political conditions; provide strong 
democracy, rule of law and human rights protection. However, the decisions about 
full socialization of the target-state in the end still derive from the common political 
and economic interests of the Union. Formally and technically, the Organization has 
very simple and strong tools to affect the process through suspension of partnership 
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 agreements with violators of liberal democratic community norms. However, none of 
the member  states has ever been excluded because of violation of human rights 
norms, for example, and cooperation with autocratic regimes has been marked as well 
in the name of common economic benefits.
134  
The manner of norm socialization by 
the EU in the states with membership perspective differs from the cooperation with 
country-outsiders or neighbors. The Russian  Federation  has been struggling for the 
equal level of partnership with Brussels since the very beginning. 
 
Matters of human rights promotion are contained in the Common Foreign and 
Security  Policy of  the  Union.  Particularly,  Russia  and  EU  have  institutionalized 
relationship  based  on   Partnership  and  Cooperation  Agreement,  which  includes 
assistantship in improvement of human rights protection as well and consists of semi- 
annual  meetings.  However,  unlike  OSCE  and  CoE,  the  EU  considers  Russia  a 
constant foreign partner, which doesn‟t strive for the Union membership. This is why 
any EU criticism regarding human rights violations in Russia is expected to be weak 
and  delicate.  Additionally,  far-reaching  economic  interests  of  the  EU  in  Russia 
certainly prevail and throw back alarms about human rights violations. Consequently, 
this issue has never caused radical enforcement steps, such as sanctions or military 
reciprocity. However,  the  Russian  Federation  has  to  adopt  and  share,  at  least 
instrumentally,  European  values  and  norms  in  order  to  get  involved  in  strategic 
partnership with EU. 
135
 
 
Council of the EU publishes annual reports on human rights and promotes 
them together with Commission, Presidency and High Representative for the CFSP. 
In addition, a Special Representative on Human Rights and European Parliament may 
operatively react and condemn the  violations in any country of the world as well. 
Despite that, the EU is still not a human rights  organization and it is limited in its 
scale of the protection, which is mainly included in the  intergovernmental bilateral 
agreements (e.g.  Article 2 of the PCA with Russia).  Besides that, EU promotes 
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 human rights at actual meetings and summits where it uses political pressure mainly 
through diplomacy (e.g. EU-Russia Summits). Moreover, the Union might be granted 
with  a  monitoring  mandate  and  produce  analytical  or  critical  reports.  European 
Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) is another tool encouraging 
human rights and strengthening civil societies  in  the target-states through financial 
aid and human resources. Its structural and institutional  activities find place in the 
gradual reports as well.
136
 
 
The road  maps  for  the  implementation  of  Four  Common  Spaces,  which 
include a  common space on freedom, security and justice, were activated in 2005 
between the EU and Russian Federation. Since then, this particular Common Space 
formed  one  more  opportunity in  order  to  condemn  human  rights  violations  and 
initiate reforms  through  political  pressure.  Unfortunately,  instead  of emphasizing 
justice and human rights the Common Space mainly focuses on the cross-border and 
international security-related issues. Other than that, Moscow is capable to question 
European human rights norms and interpret them according to its own values that 
certainly makes its self-exclusion from European integration even wider. 
137  
On one 
 
hand,  EU  is  trying  to  develop  liberal  democratic  values  in  the  surrounding 
neighborhood for the sake of regional security and prosperity. However, absence of 
the  membership  potential   weakens  EU‟s  unilateral  normative  pressure  on  the 
powerful neighbors such as Russian Federation. Even though economically beneficial 
bilateral  cooperation  is  successfully  settled,  EU   deliberately  expects  additional 
normative convergence based on the European values in order to integrate them in the 
internal affairs of Moscow. 
Overall, EU is a considerable actor in the European framework of liberal 
democratic socialization of values and norms in target states similarly to OSCE and 
CoE. However, one of the major difficulties consists in the contradiction between the 
positions of member states of the Union over common persuasive policies towards 
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 the “outsiders”.138   Additionally, a critical rhetoric of the EU officials reveals mainly 
in the specific issues such as case of “Politkovskaya” or incident of “Pussy Riot”, but 
rarely focuses on the long-term persuasive actions against systematic violations. 
 
 
5. High-Profiled Cases 
 
 
In order to understand how European exclusive and inclusive 
intergovernmental   organizations   as   well   as   non-governmental   actors   of   the 
socialization  process use argumentative and persuasive strategies in a target-state, 
political reaction of those  entities on particular cases of abuses of the freedom of 
expression in Russian Federation will be analyzed additionally in the research. It will 
help to draw a bigger image of the role of the  European  actors in monitoring the 
tendency of violations of freedom of expression involving political matters. Even if 
the number of such cases is enormous, the research is concentrating on  the certain 
high-profiled  occasions  of  murders  of  oppositional  journalists  and  intentional 
imprisonment of political nonconformists attracting extreme international attention. 
Firstly,  the  focus  will  be  directed  to  Russian  media  and  respective  oppositional 
journalists, because the vast majority of the violations of the freedom of expression 
that attracted tremendous international attention have been taken place exactly in this 
field for years. Also, an imprisonment of “Pussy  Riot” band members expressing 
political  protest,  which  caused  previously  never  witnessed  level  of  international 
anxiety, will demonstrate the most recent confrontation on the norm of freedom of 
expression between Europe and Russia. 
 
5.1. Abuses of journalists in Russia 
 
First of all, let‟s look at the overall picture of the freedom of press and facts of 
violence against journalists in Russia. For this sake the data will be described further, 
collected  by  the  Russian  and  foreign  human  rights  organizations  with  different 
methodology, but one purpose – documenting statistics of violations. One of the 
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 major national databases on journalist murders elaborated by International Federation 
of Journalists together with Glasnost Defense Foundation and Centre for Journalism 
in Extreme Situations grasps the cases according to such characteristics of the murder 
or other abuses as: „homicide‟, „accident‟,  „crossfire‟, „terrorist act‟, „incident not 
confirmed‟, and „missing‟.139  This joint database says that 146 journalists have died 
between 2000 and 2012 all over Russia.
140  
The map 1 (in Russian) of Glasnost 
 
Foundation shows level of freedom of printed and electronic media in the regions of 
the Russian Federation by March 2010. According to the map, by that time, situation 
has been improved in  6  regions and worsened  in 13, including the areas where 
journalists were assassinated. Only few regions were assessed as relatively free, but 
the majority qualified as relatively restricted or completely not free (e.g. Chechnya). 
 
 
Map 1: Карта Гласности 
 
 
The  Committee  to  Protect  Journalists  (CPJ)  separates  work-related 
murders of  journalists, which confirm the motive from the unclear cases, where 
blurry investigations have never been completed. 29 journalists have been killed since 
1998 where motive has been confirmed as an assassination related to the journalist‟s 
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 oppositional   activities.   
141    
Among  such   victims   are   high   profiled   cases   of 
Politkovskaya,  Estemirova,  Klebnikov,  Safronov  and  Baburova.  Additionally,  the 
organization considers Russia as one of the top violator countries in the world with 
high impunity index. 
In the rankings of the Paris based NGO Reporters Without Borders, which 
has been involved in the reporting of violations in media freedom in the world and 
respected by European intergovernmental organizations, Russia has been fluctuating 
around the positions with a difficult situation since 2002. Noticeable deterioration in 
2006 and 2009 has been changed by slight improvements in recent years. However, 
the map 2 demonstrates the most recent 2013 global picture of the freedom of press, 
where index includes pluralism, media independence and transparency. It respectively 
displays Russian Federation among  the troubling states with a “difficult situation” 
similarly to the previous years.
142
 
 
 
 
Map 2: Freedom of the press worldwide in 2013 
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 Overall,  activities  of  the  international  and  domestic  non-governmental 
organizations and their data play crucial role in the socialization process. Particularly, 
they direct attention of more  powerful global actors to the abuses of freedom of 
expression  in  the  norm-violating  state.  Moreover,  they  can  serve  as  unofficial 
speakers of the intergovernmental organizations, which  correspondingly act in the 
established normative and legal framework with the target-state. 
 
5.2. Politkovskaya and Estemirova 
 
The assassination of a brave journalist of Novaya Gazeta newspaper, Anna 
Politkovskaya is the case that clearly demonstrates strength and role of freedom of 
expression in a Russian society. Politkovskaya‟s open denunciation of wrongdoings 
in Russian armed forces and human  rights violations in Chechnya have served as 
powerful machinery revealing dramatic weaknesses of the government in respective 
state sectors. The job of an objective journalist became hardly manageable in Putin‟s 
Russia  since  2000  and  consequently  harassment  of  public  figures  like   Anna 
Politkovskaya and Natalya Estemirova has widely awakened local and international 
human  rights activists all over the Europe. They were among five journalists of 
Novaya Gazeta newspaper assassinated since 2000 for their profession. Even though 
political motives of these  murders have never been proved and high level officials 
ever convicted, deliberate logic of  assassination reasons turn to the profession and 
activities of the journalists. Almost a year after  Politkovskaya‟s murder in 2006, 
authorities announced ten suspects to be arrested, but six of them were freed soon. 
Main  figures  left  in  custody included  former  police  detective  and  two  Chechen 
brothers who were suspected in organization of the crime. Their third brother Rustam 
was  supposed to be the one who killed Politkovskaya, but he had fled the country 
after information  about his detention leaked in press. Trial of the arrested suspects 
was carried in 2009. A decision of Moscow Military District Court to acquit detainees 
has been overturned by the Supreme Court later, which demanded the investigation to 
be reopened. In 2011, third brother Rustam was arrested back in Chechnya and it 
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 seemed the story has been completed.
143 
However, the detention of actual performer 
still doesn‟t  lead to the concrete motives of the murder. Also in 2011 one more 
former police official Dmitry Povluchenkov was detained and accused in supporting 
the criminal group. The verdict of Moscow City court carried in a year after his arrest 
concluded  that  Povluchenkov  delivered  a  gun  to  the  killer  and  helped  him  in 
following the journalist. Povluchenkov‟s sentence came into force on  March 14, 
2013.
144  
Even though, this fact was considered in Russia as a breakthrough in this 
 
particular criminal case, the actual initiators who ordered the murder have never been 
found and tried. Soon after the assassination of Politkovskaya in 2006, Vladimir Putin 
responded to the crime as  revolting and promised to investigate it thoroughly. He 
mentioned that the murder had brought  dramatic damage to Russia. However, he 
downgraded the influence of journalist‟s critical  activities on political life of the 
country.
145  
This statement meant to indicate that there was no necessity to interrupt 
Politkovskaya‟s activities and therefore allegations towards government‟s 
involvement in the case were unjustified. After domestic and  international critique 
and   pressure   have   implied   on   government‟s   connections   with   the   murder, 
investigation  has  never followed the path leading to any of the high officials in 
Kremlin. Similarly to this,  Dmitry Medvedev pledged to investigate a murder of 
another journalist of Novaya Gazeta and  activist of the human rights organization 
“Memorial” Natalya Estemirova, who has been already  eighteenth journalist to be 
killed in the period between 2000 and 2009. 
146  
Estemirova was an active human 
 
rights  activist  reporting  about  abuses  in  North  Caucasus  and  involved  in  the 
 
investigation of Politkovskaya‟s murder. The investigation of Estemirova‟s 
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 assassination have never reached high officials in Chechnya either, but accused a 
rebel group  whose cruel behavior has once been revealed in Estemirova‟s reports. 
After two years of investigation, Novaya Gazeta and Memorial conducted their own 
investigation  and  found  errors  in   the  work  of  the  official  investigation  over 
discovering sound evidences. They blamed government for not investigating the case 
thoroughly   and   openly   condemned   Chechen   President   Ramzan   Kadyrov in 
organizing  Estemirova‟s  murder  after  what  the  head  of  Memorial  was  sued  for 
defamation and obliged to pay compensation to Kadyrov.
147
 
 
In the situation, when domestic human rights activists experience suppression 
by national  governments, a strong foreign pressure over the norm-violating state 
might play a vital role. In dealing with powerful target-states like Russian Federation, 
international  communities  use  social  influence  through  shaming  and  persuasion 
strategies hoping for better compliance with liberal democratic norms. 
 
5.2.1 International pressure 
 
The  Parliamentary  Assembly  of  the  Council   of  Europe  has   strongly 
condemned the fact of Politkovskaya‟s assassination in its resolution on “Threats to 
the lives and freedom of expression of journalists” in 2007. In the paragraph number 
8, we read a statement that justifies a boomerang effect in the norm socialization 
process. It declares that Parliamentary Assembly has been pleased with the activities 
of Europe and Moscow  based human rights NGO‟s asking for the investigation of 
Politkovskaya‟s murder. The Assembly appreciated actions of the “Glasnost Defense 
Foundation” in Moscow, “Reporters Without Borders” based in Paris, “International 
Press  Institute”  in  Vienna,  “Article  19”  in  London  and  other  organizations  that 
directed the attention of international community towards violations of freedom  of 
expression  in  Russian  Federation.  PACE  also  demanded  from  Russian  side  to 
“closely monitor the progress” in criminal investigation of the case.148  Generally, in 
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 the following years, many critical statements have been generated by the Council of 
Europe. For  instance, in 2009 Chairman of the Council of Europe Parliamentary 
Assembly‟s Sub-Committee on the Media and rapporteur on media freedom Andrew 
McIntosh   condemned   the   closure   of   the   trial   and   called   for   the   thorough 
investigation.
149  
The case of Politkovskaya and Estemirova  found a place in 2012 
PACE resolution as well, on “The honouring of obligations and commitments by the 
 
Russian  Federation”.150    The  Assembly  mentioned  that  facts  of  harassment  of 
journalists  have decreased in recent years, however, above discussed high profiled 
cases still remain  uninvestigated. The emphasis in the resolution was additionally 
strengthened by the PACE  rapporteur Gyorgy Frunda who criticized downgrading 
political pluralism in Russia and  ineffectiveness of its judiciary in both cases of 
Politkovskaya‟s  and  Estemirova‟s  murders.151    In  the  same  day  of  Estemirova‟s 
murder, Human Rights Commissioner of CoE, Thomas  Hammarberg  defined the 
tragedy as “a horrible and cowardly crime and an attack against fundamental human 
rights principles”. He called for “immediate, thorough and impartial investigation” 
and punishment  of criminals.
152  
This statement also served as a recap to pay more 
attention  on  protection  of  human  rights  activists  and  respective  organizations  in 
Russia. A rhetorical question of Council of  Europe Secretary General Terry Davis 
asking  “how many more Natalia  Estemirovas  and  Anna  Politkovskayas  must  be 
killed before the Russian authorities protect people who stand up for the human rights 
of Russian citizens”,153 reveals the tendencies of abuses of freedom of expression in 
Russia. 
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 Soon after the incident of Politkovskaya‟s assassination, Finnish presidency of 
the European Union revealed a concern and emphasized importance of guaranteeing 
the freedom of expression in democratic society. 
154 
It was followed by a resolution of 
European Parliament on EU-Russia relations after the murder of Anna Politkovskaya. 
Based on the data of Reporters Without Borders, European  Parliament stated that 
Russia made it to the top of the countries with high level of journalist murders. The 
document  criticized  overall  intimidations  and  harassments  against  independent 
journalists that dramatically affected Russia‟s reputation on international arena. The 
Brussels tried to use a strategy of shaming and social influence here, even though it 
owns stricter instruments to be used against norm-violating outsider in the process of 
socialization.  Economic,   geographical  and  political  importance  of  the  Russian 
Federation does not allow the EU to be guided by the classical approaches and cut the 
partnership or suspend common projects.  In the  resolution mentioned above, the 
Organization warned Moscow that matters of democracy and  human rights would 
become a primary topic in the agenda of their relationship since then. Additionally, 
the European Parliament called the Council to monitor the investigation closely and 
asked all other institutions to condemn the fact of violation of freedom of expression 
in Russia as  well.
155   
Swedish  presidency of the  EU immediately reacted  on  the 
 
Estemirova‟s murder in 2009 condemning “the killing of a prize-winning human 
rights activist” and demanding immediate investigation.156 In December 2012, the EU 
brought up the question of violations of human rights norms in Russia at the sixteenth 
round of human rights consultations in Brussels. European officials condemned poor 
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 investigation  in  the  cases  of  Anna  Politkovskaya  and  Natalya  Estemirova  and 
criticized mistreatment of domestic NGOs in Russia. 
Anna  Politkovskaya  is  an  owner  of  OSCE  prize  for  Journalism  and 
Democracy as an honorable contributor to the freedom of expression in media. After 
her murder, OSCE chairman statement demonstrated a deep concern: “This is a tragic 
and profoundly shocking loss, and I call upon the Russian authorities to track down 
those   responsible   as   quickly   as   possible."
157     
The  OSCE   carries   a   special 
Representative on Freedom of Media (RFOM), whose responsibility directly contains 
monitoring  and  assessing  media  freedom  in  member  states.  Miklos  Haraszti, 
respective representative has been a constant critic of the Russian government for 
years  condemning  murders  of  journalists  (especially  with  political  motives)  and 
demanding for thorough investigations. The criticism of high-profiled cases such as 
Politkovskaya, Klebnikov,  Safronov and other assassinated journalists have found 
place  in  the  yearbook  2007  of  the  RFOM.
158   
Later  in  2009,  Haraszti  openly 
condemned Russian judiciary after the Moscow  Military District Court freed three 
suspects in Politkovskaya‟s murder. The Supreme Court of the RF decided to return 
the suspects back to trial and renew the investigation immediately after such critique 
from OSCE  appeared. In his statements, Haraszti generalized whole tendency of 
Russia‟s failure to protect its journalists and referred to the “practical impunity for the 
murder and physical assault of those covering corruption and human rights issues”.159 
This time OSCE officials have been attacked back by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
of Russia criticizing rhetoric of the organization that has, according to the ministry, 
deteriorated the reputation of OSCE as whole. This action once again demonstrates 
the argumentative mode of the  socialization process, in which the norm-violating 
government is being entrapped after the criticism of its human rights practices have 
reached top level of tensions. A tendency of suppression of the independent press, 
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 systematic injustice and poor investigations create a feeling of impunity in the society 
that downgrades the power of media as a watchdog controlling wrongdoings of the 
government. “If murders,  assaults and threats against journalists prevail, the media 
cannot be free, information cannot be pluralistic and democracy cannot function”.160 
According to Committee to Protect Journalists, 16 deadly crimes against journalists in 
Russia stayed unclear along last ten years that put country among the states with poor 
records.
161
 
 
5.3. Baburova and Stanislav Merkelov 
 
Even  before  Natalya  Estemirova  was  assassinated,  the  international  and 
domestic  human rights activists were alarmed by a double murder of human rights 
lawyer Stanislav Merkelov and a journalist Anastasiya Baburova in Moscow on 19 
January 2009. Merkelov was a noticeable figure involved in monitoring the crimes 
committed by  Russian Neo-Nazis and defended anti-fascist complainants in court. 
Similarly to Merkelov, journalist Baburova had frequently criticized Nazi activists in 
newspaper publications.
162  
Merkelov  has also gone against the commander of tank 
division in Chechnya Yuri Budanov, who was  accused in rape of a young girl and 
sentenced to 10 years, but released right before Merkelov‟s murder. Additionally, the 
lawyer was involved in investigation of the issues around Khimki forest scandals. 
Two ultra-nationalist radical activists Tikhonov and Khasis were arrested already in 
autumn of 2009 and sentenced to a life imprisonment one and to 18 years another in 
2011. 
163  
Indeed, even though, two detained suspects were the members of a fascist 
group and the motives for the murder seemed to be clear, international and domestic 
voiced  the   difficulties  in  human  rights  practice  and  violations  of  freedom  of 
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 expression  in  Russia  once  again.  The  Czech  presidency  of  the  European  Union 
condemned the crime and called for “thorough, prompt and impartial 
investigation”.164  Secretary General of Council of Europe negatively assessed the 
assaults against human rights activists and linked the case of Merkelov and Baburova 
with a murder of Anna  Politkovskaya mentioning that such guesses will exist until 
those crimes are properly investigated.  Also, the statement contained concern that 
such tendencies remain “shadow over the state of the  rule of law, the freedom of 
expression and the commitment to human rights in the Russian  Federation.”165  In 
response  to  the  criticism  coming  from  international  organizations,  human  rights 
activists and state governments, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia in response 
pointed on the attempts of the West to politicize the crime and link it with previously 
raised  problems  regarding  freedom  of  expression.  
166   
Such  actions  signify  the 
confrontation between assessments of  human rights violations between Europe and 
Russia, even though the later agrees with the concept  of freedom of expression as 
whole. 
 
The president  of  European  Commission,  on  his  turn,  directly  raised  the 
question of  the  investigation of murder at the meeting with Putin soon after the 
assassination of a lawyer and a journalist and criticized the whole tendency with the 
abuses against human rights activists.
167  
The name of Anastasia Baburova found its 
place along with Politkovskaya and Estemirova in the 2011 EU resolution on the rule 
of law in Russia as well.
168 
While ranking Russia on 142 place out of 179 country in 
the world press freedom index 2011-2012, Reporters Without Borders mentioned 
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 only case of murder of Merkelov and Baburova and noted that even though the 
suspects were  detained, “aspects of the case remained unclarified   and impunity is 
still the rule for those who murder or attack journalists”.169 However, the international 
pressure turned to be successful in this case and Russian side has been applauded for 
thorough investigation and imprisonment of radical  ultra-nationalist activists. The 
international   human   rights   NGO   Committee   to   Protect   the   Journalists   and 
International  Press  Institute  have  played  a  monitoring  role  in  the  process  of 
investigation that ended with effective measures and judgment of the suspects. 
These cases were part of the series of violations of the freedom of political 
expression  and free media which has increased since 2000. In order to deny the 
criticism of the international communities, Moscow has tried to link the negative tone 
of  Europe  with  attempts  of  particular  anti-Russian  figures  (e.g.  Berezovsky)  or 
interest-groups motivated to muddle domestic order and weaken Russia‟s image and 
positions  abroad.  The  advocacy  networks  have  generated  sound  pressure  on  the 
Russian authorities urging to reopen trials and conduct investigations 
comprehensively. Even though several suspects were tried for the assassination of 
Estemirova and Politkovskaya in recent years, unlike Baburova‟s and Merkelov‟s 
case, the official inquiry has never led to the actual people who ordered the crimes.
170
 
 
Differences between the outcomes of those incidents derive from the specifics of the 
incidents. On one hand, successful conviction of Nazi nonconformists may increase 
Russia‟s international image, especially when it comes to the high-profiled occasions. 
The pressure from outside is still significant though for tracing the process that helps 
to avoid involvement of interest-groups in the investigation or a trial. On the other 
hand,  Russian  government  acts  protectively  when  the  case  comprises  suspicions 
about the possible connections of the state authorities with the particular incidents. 
That‟s why the government tries to control sectors of public life where citizens could 
express their opinions. The situation has deteriorated since Putin came to power 
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 leading to the killing of up to 19 journalists.
171  
In near past, six journalists have 
already been killed in 2011 and four in 2012 with a motive of suppression of their 
activities.
172
 
Legal and political language of Europe regarding the practice of freedom of 
expression in the Russian Federation has been arising questions of non-compliance to 
the accepted human rights norms. An analysis of legal perspectives through Russian 
court cases reviewed by ECtHR showed us that the affiliation with Council of Europe 
and  its  legal  mechanisms  can  actually  influence  the   process  of  socialization 
significantly.  In  addition,  international  political  control  and  expectations  of  the 
international  organizations,  INGOs  and  domestic  actors  may  urge  a  target-state 
reconsider its instruments for guaranteeing freedom of expression in its borders. This 
whole process leading to eternal habitualization and prescribing to the particular norm 
a “taken for  granted” status in Russian Federation passes in the context of dueling 
discourses  and  interpretations.  In  order  to  understand  the  tendency  of  legal  and 
political confrontation over the freedom of expression between Europe and Russian 
Federation the research additionally contains  analysis of the case of “Pussy Riot” 
band members imprisoned for their political protest in Moscow‟s Cathedral of Christ 
the Savior. This movement has basically awakened masses of human rights activists 
and regular people in the West, including famous cultural and political figures. 
 
 
5.4. Pussy Riot 
 
The incident itself took place in the central church of Moscow on February 
 
21, 2012 and contained elements of a dance performed by several women in colorful 
balaclavas and  accompanied by the politically motivated punk-rock song/“prayer” 
asking Virgin Mary to “drive Putin out”. The dance actually lasted less than a minute, 
but  the video edited  with  a song and  footage  of dances  caused arrests  of main 
performers of the dance eventually in couple of weeks. Three arrested members 
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 Nadezhda  Tolokonnikova,  Yekaterina  Samutsevich  and  Maria  Alyokhina  were 
accused in the hooliganism motivated with religious hatred and sentenced to the two 
years of jail on August 17, 2012. However, soon in October of the same year Moscow 
appeals court released Yekaterina Samutsevich as she hasn‟t taken an active part in 
the February protest, but other two detained members of the band stayed in custody 
and were sent to the prison colony. 
173
 
 
Now, the whole case itself involves several arguable aspects and emerges 
debates  around  political  speculation,  feminist  perspectives,  role of the  church  in 
political life of the country, etc. Even though these topics are interrelated and further 
analysis will be touching them at some point, this research is profoundly focusing on 
the  legal  matters  and  features  of  international   pressure  regarding  freedom  of 
expression,  which  has  been  mainly disputed between  Europe  and  Russia in  this 
particular occasion. 
 
 
5.4.1 Legal aspects 
 
The  investigation  of  the  incident  in  the  church  has  initially  been  held 
regarding two articles of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation: Article 282 on 
incitement of national, racial,  or religious enmity and Article 213 – hooliganism. 
However,  in  the  end,  the  case  appeared  to  court  based  only  on  the  matters  of 
hooliganism, but with religious hatred. The respective article states: “(1) 
Hooliganism, that is, a gross violation of the public order  which expresses patent 
contempt for society, attended by violence against private persons or by the threat of 
its use, and likewise by the destruction or damage of other people's property, shall be 
punishable by compulsory works for a term of 120 to 180 hours, or by corrective 
labor for a term of six to twelve months, or by arrest for a term of four to six months, 
or by deprivation of liberty for a term of up to two years. (2) The same act, if it is: a) 
committed by a group of persons, a group of persons in a preliminary conspiracy, or 
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 an organized group; b) connected with resistance to a representative of authority or to 
any other person who fulfills the duty of protecting the public order or who prevents 
violation of the public order; c) committed by a person who was earlier convicted of 
hooliganism-shall be punishable by compulsory works for a term of 180 to 240 hours, 
or by corrective labor for a term of one to two years, or by deprivation of liberty for a 
term of up to five years. (3) Hooliganism committed with the use of arms or objects 
used as arms shall be punishable by deprivation of liberty for a term of four to eight 
years.” 174  Consequently, the district court emphasized second part of the Article 
 
regarding a group of persons committing a crime of hooliganism. However, if we 
derive from the first part of the article it‟s questionable that a short performance of 
the punk rock band in the church has violated the public order dramatically, violated 
individuals or damaged other people‟s property. On the other hand, the violence can 
be exposed in several means such as interrupting public events (e.g. church service), 
disturbing the work of enterprises or disrupting public  transportation, which may 
cause long-term moral and/or physical damages to the citizens.
175 
Obviously, an anti- 
 
Putin protest of the women in balaclavas has not paralyzed the church, but interrupted 
the  process  of  service  for  less  than  a  minute  without  direct  physical  or  moral 
violations  against  people.  The  believers  could  continue  the  service  as  soon  as 
“hooligans”  were  removed  from  the  church. Another  inconsistency  lays  in  the 
religious  and  political  motives  of  the  incident  itself.  The  performance  has  not 
apparently included anti-religious symbols nor been directed against the  persons of 
different nationalities, with diverse religious and political views. Only edited video 
clip with a song contained lyrics of enmity against one person – Vladimir Putin. The 
article on  hooliganism doesn‟t comprise a punishment for such sort of actions. In 
opposite, a debate would seize if the band members would be accused in defamatory 
actions (similarly to the cases analyzed earlier), which, according to the Civil Code, 
does not consider imprisonment. At the same time, according to the ECtHR case law 
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 the politicians  are  expected  to  tolerate  a  criticism  and  protests  against  them  in 
whatever  form  more  accurately  than  any  other  citizens,  because  it  guarantees 
existence of a functional freedom of expression necessary for any democratic society. 
The band members of Pussy Riot itself has numerously admitted that the 
performance  in  the  church  has  contained  only  a  political  message  against  the 
government  of  the  President  and  head  of  Russian  Orthodox  Church,  who  were 
accused earlier in a very close pre-electoral cooperation and sharing the influence in 
the society.
176  
In her final closing statement, Maria Alyokhina, one of the detained 
 
members of the band noted that the protest has been directed to the Putin and the 
whole political system, which is associated with him as well as the involvement of 
the   Patriarch   in   the   political   life   of   the   society.
177    
In   addition,   Nadezhda 
Tolokonnikova, another arrested woman, defined their performance in the church as 
nothing more but a “political action that engages art forms”. 178  All members have 
apologized multiple times to those believers whose  feelings could be hurt by their 
actions and stated that the campaign hasn‟t pursued a goal to downgrade Christianity, 
but covered mostly disagreement with activities of institutions of the President and 
the Church. 
Despite all this, the final verdict of the Moscow Khamovniki district court 
didn‟t even  include any political motives or defamatory actions against any high 
officials, but emphasized  the matters of hooliganism expressed in the intentional 
violation of public peace with motives of  religious enmity and hatred that insulted 
numerous believers presented at the service as well as other citizens influenced by the 
distributed video clip. The court also referred to the assessment of the Orthodox 
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 Church, which defines the incident as blasphemous and condemns humiliation of 
 
believers‟ feelings. 179 
 
The incident would probably stay unnoticed for large masses in the world like 
other similar campaigns of the same punk rock band. However, the trial with criminal 
conviction, pre-electoral propaganda of liberal opposition and attempts of ruling party 
and the church to unify supporters around nationalistic ideas transformed the whole 
case into cause célèbre.
180  
Apparently, the idea  of  freedom of expression has been 
sacrificed to these possible back stage political games. 
In the case Handyside v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human 
rights has clearly defined that freedom of expression is one of the most significant 
features of the democratic society and “it is applicable not only to “information” or 
“ideas” that  are  favorably  received  or  regarded  as  inoffensive  or  as  a  matter of 
indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector 
of the   population. Such   are   the   demands of   that pluralism,   tolerance   and 
broadmindedness without which there is no “democratic society”.”181 
 
The appeal from Pussy Riot imprisoned members has appeared in the ECtHR 
already in the  beginning of February, 2013. Main claims in the pending complaint 
Nadezhda Tolokonnikova,  Maria Alyokhina and Yekaterina Samutsevich v. Russia 
currently cover four articles of the European Convention on Human Rights to which, 
according to the plaintiffs, Moscow Khamovniki district court has failed to comply: 
freedom of expression (Art. 10), right to liberty and security of  person  (Art. 5), 
prohibition of torture (Art. 3) and right to a fair trial (Art. 6). 
182  
Applicants have 
 
continuously argued that the actions of punk rock band had comprised only a political 
protest exposed in the modern artistic performance. Also, the complaint explains the 
reasons why the political protest took place in the church. On February 1, 2012, at the 
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 Bishop‟s Council organized in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior, the Patriarch of 
Russian   Orthodox  Church  Kirill  publicly  supported  Premier  Vladimir  Putin‟s 
candidacy in the upcoming presidential elections. According to the complainants, this 
fact irritated the members of  Pussy Riot band who artistically demonstrated their 
disagreement through dancing and singing. 
 
 
5.4.2 International pressure 
 
Similarly to the previously discussed cases, the incident of Pussy Riot has 
triggered a reaction in the West. European intergovernmental and non-governmental 
organizations as well as  state officials, which play crucial role in the socialization 
process   of   the   Russian   Federation,   have   generated   global   criticism   against 
prosecution of the punk-rock band members. 
In the statement of High Representative of the European Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission Catherine Ashton, 
issued at the same day when the verdict of three convicted women was announced, 
she evaluated the sentence as “disproportionate” and questioned Russia‟s 
commitments   to   the   international   obligations   to   hold   “fair,   transparent   and 
independent legal process”. Additionally, she emphasized another important factor of 
international  obligations  –  “respect  for freedom  of expression” and  voiced  EU‟s 
concern about the prosecution of political  opposition. At the same time, Ashton 
reminded to Russian political elite that matters of human rights are still a significant 
part of the relationship between the EU and Russia.
183 
Similarly, on the same day of 
 
the verdict, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Dunja Mijatović 
condemned  the   tendency  of  violations  of  freedom  of  expression  in  Russian 
Federation and noted that “no  matter how provocative, satirical or sensitive” is the 
speech, it should not be restricted by the  accusation in hooliganism and religious 
hatred. Moreover, in her statement, we can see that  OSCE  is concerned with the 
compliance of the norm-violating state to the main principles of the organization 
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 about human rights and particularly freedom of expression. The statement criticizes 
much broader  tendency of the practice of freedom of expression and calls for its 
improvement and even changes of respective laws.
184  
In his statement, the President 
of  the  Parliamentary  Assembly  of  the  Council  of  Europe  Jean-Claude  Mignon 
marked that interference and restriction in the freedom of expression are acceptable 
for the democratic societies if there is a need for such measures. This tone particularly 
reminds the language of the ECtHR decisions on Grinberg v. Russia, Krasulya v. 
Russia and other similar cases. However, according to Mignon, the limitation should 
be “proportionate”  as  it  has  also  been  mentioned  in  the  statement  of  Catherine 
Ashton. Thus, two years sentence for Pussy Riot band members has been perceived 
as remarkably unfair. The President reminded about the importance of ECHR and the 
case law of ECtHR, which should have been respected while revising the verdict.
185
 
However, despite this “hint” the appeal‟s court only released one detained woman 
 
and left other two in arrest. 
 
The reference  to  disproportionate  decision  has  been  made  by the  French 
foreign ministry spokesman Vincent Floreani as well, who noted: “The process is not 
over, since appeals in  Russia and in Strasbourg (to the European Court of Human 
Rights) has not been exhausted.”186  Even though the appeals in Russia didn‟t prove 
the expectations fully, it‟s obvious that Europe still hopes that justice will be reached 
through European legal mechanisms. It once again proves the strength of legal means 
in affecting the behavior of a strong norm-violating state like Russia. Alistair Burt, 
the Foreign Office Minister of the UK actually turned attention to conditions in which 
 
women  were  detained/tried  and  assessed  Russia‟s  domestic  court  decision  as 
 
“disproportionate response to an expression of political belief”.187  Similarly to other 
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 high European officials, Burt‟s tone principally doubts functionality of rule of law 
and implementation of obligations regarding protection of the freedom of expression 
in Russian Federation. Since the Pussy Riot the appeals court decision on leaving two 
members of the band in  jail, German Chancellor was the first from European high 
officials to visit Russia. Merkel raised a  question of vast violations of freedom of 
expression in Russia and criticized tendencies of a poor practice of human rights and 
application of rule of law. Regarding Pussy Riot, she mentioned that  in  Germany, 
such   demonstration   would   definitely   not   cause   criminal   conviction   of   the 
protesters.
188 
It has not been the first critical announcement of the Chancellor though. 
 
Soon after the Moscow Khamovniki district court publicized the decision regarding 
imprisonment of the band members, Angela Merkel defined the sentence "excessively 
harsh"  and  "not  compatible  with  the  European  values  of  the  rule  of  law  and 
democracy to which Russia, as a member of the Council of Europe, has committed 
itself."
189 
However, back to the Merkel-Putin‟s face-to-face conversation, the Russian 
 
counterpart openly accused the Pussy Riot band members in anti-Semitism, which 
cannot be tolerated by the State.
190  
This fact once again indicates on the successful 
attempts of Europe to  promote human rights standards in Russia through political 
persuasion strategy entrapping the norm-violating state into argumentative mode. 
Vladimir Putin‟s arguments about the incident have essentially been based on 
the protection  of religious feelings of the believers and moral grounds of Russian 
society. Even before the appeals court delivered its final decision, Putin evaluated the 
conviction charges as fully reasonable, because the Pussy Riot band members have 
tried  to  destroy  morals  and  ethics  of  Russian  state  and  broke  law,  which  is 
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 punishable.
191  
Thus, he had numerously responded to critique of the West justifying 
the rightfulness of the Pussy Riot verdict as a necessary step for punishment of “an 
act of group sex aimed at hurting religious feelings”.192  Putin has directly indicated 
that the protesters insulted large  number of people, thus state is obliged to protect 
them as well as “the morality of the  country.”193  Obviously, Putin tries to justify 
abroad  the  actions  that  Russian  authorities  make  domestically.  He  had  equally 
responded to the foreign criticism over the new law on “Foreign Agents” considering 
legitimate control of external money transferred to domestic NGOs.
194
 
Similarly,  Vladimir  Zhirinovsky,  the  leader  of  Liberal  Democrats,  have 
accused the West in the tendency of supporting anti-Russian “bandits, criminals, drug 
addicts  and  prostitutes”   in   order  to  speculate  and  keep  criticizing  Moscow 
eternally.
195  
Regarding Pussy Riot, he has also specifically emphasized English title 
of the band, which could be directed to the large masses in the West. 
Even if Zhirinovsky is right in this sense, the particular actions of the punk- 
rock band and global reaction in result showed the effectiveness of boomerang effect 
in the socialization process. Politically driven anti-governmental feminist group has 
successfully  attracted  attention  of  transnational  advocacy  networks,  which  have 
particularly   re-emerged   international   pressure   on   the   norm-violating   Russian 
government. 
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 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
This thesis has shown the role of European legal and political mechanisms in 
the  socialization process of the Russian Federation through promotion of human 
rights. Particularly, theoretical and practical framework of the freedom of expression 
has led to the understanding of  the wider problem of acceptance and practice of 
human rights  norms  according to  the  European  standards  in  Russia.  In  order to 
systematically summarize theory-driven empirical research, I will  firstly generalize 
findings from the analysis of placement of ECHR in legal system of the Russian 
Federation and outcomes of the court cases comprising violations of freedom of 
expression. Secondly, the results of the analysis of international political pressure will 
be connected with theoretical background described earlier. Finally, I will conclude 
with emphasizing possible ways out from the stagnation in the socialization process 
of the Russian Federation. 
 
 
As for the placement of international human rights law in the legal system of 
Russia, we have observed that the European instruments have determinately affected 
domestic   practices   and   jurisprudence.   Formally,   the   Council   of   Europe   has 
institutionally penetrated the ECHR and the case law of the ECtHR in Russian legal 
framework. Actual court cases on freedom of  expression and respective decisions 
concluded  by  the  Strasbourg  Court  illustrate  European   understanding  of  this 
particular human rights norm to which Russia is obliged to comply. For  almost a 
decade, the government of Russia has been entrapped in the argumentative rhetoric as 
a norm-violating state through the court cases reviewed in the ECtHR. The conflict 
between  commonly  agreed  standard  of  freedom  of  expression  and  contradictory 
national practice of defamation charges and criminal convictions urged the Russian 
Supreme Court to issue regulations  from 2003 on jurisdiction of recognized courts 
and from 2005 on application of Article 10 of the ECHR in the courts of all instances. 
Additionally, the Article 129 of Criminal Code on defamation was abrogated in 2011 
as well as a new legal act on execution of the ECtHR judgments has been drafted in 
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 March,   2013.   Thus,   altogether,   these   facts   demonstrate   that   Europe‟s   legal 
instruments  accompanied  by  shaming  policies  have  produced  actual  results  and 
moved the process of  socialization forward. Overall, the research argues that the 
ECHR is very poorly internalized in  the  legal space of the Russian Federation and 
freedom of expression norm badly habitualized. However, the analyzed court cases 
show only tendency and not the whole situation. Future progress will still depend on 
the practices of national courts and frequency of applications to the  international 
norms. 
 
 
Regarding  the  matters  of  international  political  pressure  as  a  strategy  of 
persuasion   and   social  reinforcement  in  the  international  socialization  process, 
European intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations have pushed Russia 
to reexamine its practices for guaranteeing  freedom of expression. Critical rhetoric 
directed to shame the state with globally negative attitude  has actually entrapped 
Russian government in the argumentative mode. Moscow has numerously attempted 
to blame external anti-Russian interest groups in the spoiling country‟s reputation 
abroad   and  accused  Western  powers  in  politicization  of  high-profiled  cases. 
Additionally, Russia  had  commenced debate over the legitimacy of violations and 
presented distinct moral definitions of the freedom of expression norm that has put its 
validity  under  danger.  All  in  all,  Western  advocacy  networks  have  successfully 
pressed the norm-violating state to renew investigations and trials over the murders of 
oppositional  journalists.  The  Committee  to  Protect  Journalists  had successfully 
monitored and pushed Russian authorities to investigate the murder of Merkelov 
and Baburova. Other cases of harassments against journalists 
Politkovskaya and Estemirova have particularly shown Moscow‟s hostile reaction 
denying government‟s connection with the crimes. The EU on the other hand,  has  
clearly  placed  the matters  of human rights  on  the agenda of bilateral relations 
with Russia. Even though the strength of Brussels in socializing process of an  
outsider  without  membership  perspective  is  weak,  such  rhetoric  nevertheless 
contributes in mutually driven persuasive policies of Western actors. 
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 In general, Russia has accepted the language of human rights in its discourse 
and multiple tactical concessions have been made. One of the central actions in such 
moments is supporting domestic activists who will then lead the process from inside. 
Glasnost Defense Foundation, Memorial, newspaper Novaya Gazeta, feminist punk- 
rock band Pussy Riot have particularly generated a boomerang effect with triggering 
international attention around the suppression of  freedom of expression in Russia. 
However, as the tactical concessions phase of the spiral model suggests, boomerang 
arrow might take wrong directions. In the case of Pussy Riot, Russian  authorities 
have successfully emerged strong national opposition based on religious feelings 
against external enemies and succeeded to legitimize suppression of such opposition. 
Additionally,  the  future  financial  and  material  support  for Russian human rights 
activists has become blurry  after adoption of a new NGO Foreign Agents Law to 
control foreign money flaws. 
 
 
Theoretically,  the  process  of  international  socialization  in  target-state  is 
expected  to  culminate  with  everlasting  habitualization  phase  when  human  rights 
norms become “taken for  granted.” Legal and political analyses have particularly 
shown the complexity of the Russian case, which displays a state capable enough to 
oppose prompt internalization of Western values. If the  bargaining attempts over 
human rights norms are seen in Moscow as an instrument for pursuing  personal 
political  and  economic  interests,  rationalist  approach  is  not  keen  to  succeed. 
Additionally, Russia is not struggling for membership to the EU or for better records 
in CoE and OSCE, thus it doesn‟t receive enough rewards except economic benefits, 
which are out of the human rights sector. That‟s why the socialization process enters 
into stalemate, where internalization and habitualziation phase tend to be delayed. A 
“prescriptive status” to the norm is possible to  maintain  only through permanent 
international control, where Russian government would care  about  its international 
image. Even if the question of common applicability of the norms emerges long-term 
debate, it‟s vitally important that validity is recognized at the same level by both 
parties. This thesis has argued that legal means in the socialization process produce 
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 the most effective outcomes where political pressure should play a backing role and 
drag the norm-violating state out from the impunity and stagnation and lead towards 
justice and democratic progress. 
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